
Utica Risk Services: Arabic-language services firm, MENA political economy, risk analysis | Publisher of #InsideIraqiPolitics newsletter |
Joined September 2011
- Tweets52.3K
- Following673
- Followers13.1K
- Likes1.6K
Kirk H. Sowell retweeted
My latest:
I was a child when the KDP–PUK civil war began in 1994. Back then, I couldn't understand why even my cousins were fighting on opposite sides. I grew up amid their conflict and later started researching the war and the aftermath to understand the roots of the conflict.
In this piece, I trace the roots of their rivalry, bringing together history, analysis, and my own experience to understand the new cycle of the conflict following the KDP's unilateral election of parliament's speakership and Bafel Talabani's response.
theamargi.com/posts/the-vici…
Kirk H. Sowell retweeted
Thank you to everyone here who wrote to me to express condolences on my father's recent passing. I now feel a sense of closure after his burial and writing this tribute to him and his life on my blog, which I hope you will enjoy reading aymennaltamimi.com/p/in-memo…
تعليقات مهمة من د. اياد العنبر عن تغييرات في مناصب رفيعة من قبل رئيس الحكومة العراقية و السياقات القانونية المتعلقة بها
@ayadhussein1
youtube.com/watch?v=VZ-Ql48i…
331
Kirk H. Sowell retweeted
Great to see @edwardlucas' review of my book "We Shall Outlast Them":
"[Notte's] reporting is meticulous, the descriptions vivid, and the conclusion bleak: Russia is using the West’s own weakness to beat us."
edwardlucas.substack.com/p/w…
The use of the word "army" below should be in quotes. PM Zaidi himself said they would be joining the Hashd, to which they have long been tied due to the Iran factor.
nitter.cf/i/trending/21146421765…
1
263
#New article please read -
Iraq's Dilemma with Militias After 'Sovereignty Day'
khsowell.substack.com/p/iraq…
2
277
Kirk H. Sowell retweeted
👇This remarkable Reuters investigation published today reveals the extraordinary damage inflicted by Iran's precision strikes on critical Persian Gulf infrastructure, how regional governments have concealed its true extent, and lends strong credence to longstanding reports that the UAE effectively paid Iran to ward off further attacks.
On the last point, Reuters reports that Abu Dhabi agreed to unlock at least $10 billion in frozen Iranian funds, with $3 billion reportedly released, in exchange for Tehran halting attacks on Emirati infrastructure.
The UAE denies any such deal, but notably, no further strikes on UAE infrastructure have been reported since May 17.
Other major findings:
• Scale and precision: Reuters documents at least 135 attacks on 84 infrastructure sites across seven Persian Gulf Arab countries, often striking indispensable components whose destruction crippled entire facilities for months or even years.
• Concealing the damage: Persian Gulf Arab governments repeatedly attributed damage to falling debris from intercepted Iranian missiles and drones.
Reuters identified at least 34 official statements making such claims. But 14 specialists who reviewed the evidence considered it “highly improbable” that debris accounted for the systematic destruction of critical equipment across so many facilities.
• Restrictions on reporting: The UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain have restricted the photographing and sharing of images from attack sites, making independent assessments difficult and obscuring the true extent of the damage.
• Sophisticated Iranian targeting intelligence: Iran repeatedly struck critical equipment concealed inside buildings or otherwise difficult to identify from satellite imagery.
Three officials told Reuters that Tehran relies on networks of informants with access to sensitive facilities, helping explain the extraordinary precision of some attacks.
The broader strategic implications are enormous. Iran has demonstrated an ability to inflict substantial economic damage across the Persian Gulf despite overwhelming US conventional military superiority.
And this is precisely why renewed all-out fighting, particularly an escalation into more extensive infrastructure warfare, carries such enormous risks.
The destruction could trigger even greater economic shocks far beyond the Middle East.
reuters.com/investigates/spe…
A two-post concise initial report on the completion of the Iraqi cabinet earlier this evening. More to come.
substack.com/@khsowell/note/…
2
380
Iraq awaits the completion of its cabinet later today. Or maybe only a partial completion. We will see.
substack.com/@khsowell/note/…
249
Iraq News Agency gives names for the bulk of the ministries parliament is to vote on later today, Thursday. I'll write something in English on this once the voting is done.
ina.iq/ar/political/276201-8…
My comment with link to parliament's schedule regarding the planned vote in the Iraqi parliament tomorrow to fill the remaining cabinet posts.
substack.com/@khsowell/note/…
256
Kirk H. Sowell retweeted
Water Deficit Deepens in the South as the Euphrates Runs High
By @BenjaminFeve
"Syria consumes around 18 billion cubic meters of water a year against 16 billion in renewable resources.
The two-billion-cubic-meter gap is covered mainly by groundwater and lake reserves.
Agriculture accounts for around 88% of use, and dam reservoirs remain below 50% in the south and below 20% in Daraa & Quneitra despite last winter’s rainfall....
open.substack.com/pub/benjam…
Sadiqun (AAH) is open about the fact that ministerial posts are based on political trades, not the qualifications of the candidate.
This quoted post is unavailable.
1
274
Of course the deputy PM posts are symbolic, have been in the past, & will be made even more pointless if they go forward with this silly idea of having 4 deputy PMs.
Of Iraq's four deputy prime minister posts, one will go to the Kurds, specifically the KDP, two to Shia parties and one to Sunni Arabs.
However, Bangin Rekani, the KDP's original candidate, has reportedly withdrawn because the portfolio allocated to his party, social development, is seen as largely ceremonial and lacking real powers.
One Shia deputy will oversee energy and the other services and reconstruction, while the Sunni deputy will oversee economic affairs, all considerably more influential portfolios. The KDP is still expected to keep its deputy premiership, with another candidate replacing Rekani.
This marks a reduction in the KDP's influence compared with the previous cabinet, in which its deputy prime minister held the economic and financial affairs portfolio, now replaced by social development.
A new Minister of State for Foreign Affairs post is also reportedly being created and allocated to the Turkey-backed Iraqi Turkmen Front. Shia parties originally proposed the position specifically to dilute the KDP's control of the Foreign Ministry, which the party is expected to retain. It is the only new minister of state position being created.
In effect, while additional posts are being created to accommodate more parties and communities, their distribution appears to reduce the influence of some of the parties within the federal government.
The KDP specifically is moving from the deputy premiership for economic and financial affairs to the considerably weaker social development portfolio, while the ministries it is expected to retain, esp Foreign Affairs, could see their responsibilities overlap with newly created senior posts.
This suggests that, despite keeping its ministerial portfolios and a deputy premiership, the KDP could emerge with less practical authority than it exercised in the previous government.
1
2
426








