prasad sangameswaran

Statement : The blocking of BitChat's code on GitHub is unconstitutional and authoritarian. New Delhi, 24 July 2026 The Internet Freedom Foundation (IFF) condemns the order issued by the Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre (I4C), Ministry of Home Affairs, directing GitHub to remove the code repositories of BitChat. The order, Notice No. 11072601011432, was issued at 11:16 pm on 23 July 2026 under Section 79(3)(b) of the Information Technology Act, 2000 read with Rule 3(1)(d) of the IT Rules, 2021. The order directs GitHub to disable access to three repositories, including the Android application and its release files, within three hours. It threatens the platform with loss of safe harbour and criminal prosecution. No copy was published by the Government of India. The public learnt of it from a post by @jack, whose team develops BitChat. Censorship in India now comes to light through disclosure by the censored. Since 17 July 2026, the Ministry of Home Affairs has suspended mobile internet around Jantar Mantar as per public reports about five times, most recently within a 1.5 kilometre radius from 4 pm until midnight on 23 July. That radius takes in Janpath and parts of Connaught Place. Reports describe signal jammers at the protest site and people walking two kilometres before their phones work. Inside that zone a student separated from her group during a detention drive cannot send a message to say where she is. Thousands of students and young people have camped at Jantar Mantar since June, seeking accountability for examination irregularities. Permission for their march to Parliament was refused. Metro stations were shut and also internet connectivity has been blocked. BitChat is an open source application built for exactly this situation. It passes messages from phone to phone over Bluetooth, without mobile networks or a central server. It is striking that the order does not identify a single unlawful message. It objects to what BitChat is. In its own words, the application is dangerous because it enables communication "even during network restrictions" and can "circumvent lawful restrictions" during "internet shutdowns". Hence, the government's objection is that citizens can speak to one another while it has switched the internet off. The order is illegal on at least four grounds. 1. Section 79(3)(b) is not a blocking power. In Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1, the Supreme Court read down the provision. Intermediaries may be required to act only on a court order, or a government notification confined to the grounds under Article 19(2) of the Constitution. Blocking is governed exclusively by Section 69A and the Blocking Rules, 2009, which require a hearing and reasons recorded in writing, subject to review. Directions issued under Section 79(3)(b), Rule 3(1)(d) and the Sahyog Portal evade these safeguards, and constitutional challenges to this parallel regime are pending before High Courts. 2. The reasons in the order are circular. The order asserts that the repositories contain "information which is prohibited under any law" without naming any such information, and rests on what the application is "capable of" enabling. Anticipated misuse of a communications tool is not a lawful basis to prohibit the tool. By this logic a telephone exchange could be sealed. 3. The order cites Section 43 of the IT Act, a civil compensation provision, alongside conspiracy and abetment offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, against a platform that hosts code. 4. A three hour deadline issued close to midnight forecloses legal assessment and recourse, and fails the proportionality standard in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020) 3 SCC 637. The order also fails on its own terms as deleting a repository does not delete the application from any phone that carries it, and the mesh keeps functioning without servers. What the takedown actually prevents is scrutiny of the underlying code. IFF demands that the Government of India: 1. Withdraw Notice No. 11072601011432 dated 23 July 2026 issued to GitHub. 2. Publish every takedown direction issued under Section 79(3)(b), Rule 3(1)(d) and the Sahyog Portal, with the reasons recorded for each. 3. Restore full connectivity around Jantar Mantar, publish all suspension orders, and disclose the legal authority for the deployment of jammers. We stand with the developers and the young protesters whose speech this order seeks to silence.