
PhD Student @UNC_econ / Interested in Microeconomic theory
- Tweets97
- Following584
- Followers108
- Likes572

ALT We study capital budgeting when a manager privately knows project productivity and her empire-building benefits, while headquarters lacks credible priors. Headquarters minimizes maximum regret relative to informed investment. Without compensation, the optimal policy is a spending cap balancing empire-building overinvestment against profitable investment forgone. Compensation helps when empire-building incentives are weak. The optimal payment incentivizes restraint, declines with investment, and reaches zero at the spending cap, supporting greater managerial discretion. When empire-building incentives are strong, compensation cannot distinguish productive investment from biased expansion; therefore, a spending cap alone is optimal.

ALT We study monopoly regulation when capacity is contractible but subsequent output is not. A firm privately observes its production cost before installing costly capacity and then choosing output, while the regulator cannot use transfers. We provide sufficient conditions under which a single capacity floor implements an optimal mechanism with full participation. The floor raises output by changing investment while leaving utilization to the firm after installation costs are sunk. Under additional conditions, the allocation has three regions: laissez-faire, full utilization of the floor, and underutilization. High-cost types knowingly install capacity they will not fully use, yet produce more than under laissez-faire. This physical waste is a necessary evil of optimal regulation that expands service. We also show that underutilization can persist in optimal regulation with capacity-contingent subsidies or a common entry fee.

ALT A principal relies on information held by a biased agent in decision-making. Without a prior over the circumstances that may arise, she designs a delegation rule to minimize the worst-case regret. Optimal delegation combines a default action, a fixed gap above it, and a higher discretionary interval with random boundaries. This structure separates two margins: whether the decision departs from the default and how much discretion the agent receives conditional on doing so. The default and gap limit excessive adjustment when little adaptation is warranted, while the higher interval preserves flexibility when larger adjustments are needed. Randomizing the discretionary interval's floor and ceiling hedges the principal's exposure across potential worst-case states. This rule is optimal among all stochastic incentive-compatible mechanisms.

































