Finally feels like the Great Asset Tokenization Wave is upon us. Act accordingly.

USDe supply is going to print Bullish $ENA and @StablecoinX $USDE

Gold is going to rip $BTC is gold high beta $ENA is BTC high beta $USDE StablecoinX is ENA high beta Hope that helps

Will try to synthesize @LukeGromen's recent posts and interviews on how the United States actually lowers debt-to-GDP from current levels—not the spreadsheet version of “grow plus inflate,” but the sequence he argues is required once interest and entitlements already exceed receipts. Hopefully Luke can opine if I am off the mark. The popular “grow and inflate our way out” story is simple. U.S. GDP is about $32.5 trillion. If the economy delivers 5% real growth and 5% inflation, nominal GDP rises by roughly $3.25 trillion a year. The deficit is about $2 trillion. If those numbers hold, the debt-to-GDP ratio starts to fall. On a spreadsheet that is correct. Through that lens, today’s higher yields also look tolerable: if nominal growth is ~10%, a 5% ten-year is not a crisis, and the Fed can still hike to fight inflation. That is the consensus inference. Gromen’s claim is that the inference is wrong at this starting level of debt. What the story leaves out is the rest of the balance sheet. Gromen’s “true interest expense”—interest plus entitlements plus veterans’ benefits—already consumes more than 100% of federal receipts, around 105%. Hundreds of percent of GDP in off-balance-sheet promises are still rolling onto the books. Those off-balance-sheet promises are mainly Social Security and Medicare: legally scheduled benefits that are not counted in debt held by the public. Gromen puts that stock around 300% of GDP. OASI, the retirement-and-survivors part of Social Security, is projected to deplete around 2032. After that the shortfall is no longer an actuarial note; it is new Treasury issuance. That is why the deficit is not a fixed $2 trillion. Debt itself has been compounding faster than 5% (he has used roughly 8% CAGR against a 5% ten-year). If the stock of debt is growing faster than the GDP growth you are counting on, the ratio does not fall. Labor still supplies about half of tax receipts. A fast AI wave that replaces high-income jobs with cheap software can shrink the tax base before it enlarges taxable GDP. Five percent real growth in a mature, highly leveraged economy is not the base case. It is the optimistic case. Luke’s point is that the destination—higher nominal GDP and a lower debt ratio—is the right one. But how you get there, and in what order, is the whole argument. You cannot run austerity, or even a strong-dollar growth boom, first. The reason is the United States’ net international investment position (NIIP): the difference between U.S. assets abroad and foreign-owned assets in the United States. That NIIP is deeply negative, on the order of –$22 trillion. Foreigners also sit on a large stock of dollar-denominated debt, roughly $13-14 trillion. Austerity or a boom that lifts the dollar makes that dollar debt more expensive to service. To raise dollars, foreign holders sell Treasuries and other U.S. assets. Yields gap higher. At current debt levels, higher yields immediately raise federal interest expense, which widens the deficit, which requires more issuance, which pushes yields again. That is the spiral. Cutting spending before the existing debt stock has been devalued is, in his phrase, a root canal with a shotgun: it can work on paper and still kill the patient. The dollar-growth path and the spending-cut path fail for the same reason. Both strengthen the dollar before the debt has been marked down. Japan is the usual counterexample, and it does not travel. Japan ran a much higher debt ratio for decades because it is a creditor with a large positive NIIP, funds itself at home, and long enjoyed U.S. defense cover. It could pin yields inside a domestic savings system. The United States is a debtor with a deeply negative NIIP. It relies on foreign buyers. A stronger dollar is a margin call on those borrowers; they sell Treasuries to raise dollars. Japan’s emergency “piggy bank” is selling U.S. assets, which exports the stress into the Treasury market. Gromen’s line is that the two cases are apples and oranges—and that Japan, once the exception at 130% debt/GDP, is now trying to inflate the debt away as well. The order he argues for is therefore mechanical. Cut policy rates and interest on reserves to zero so the government stops paying a rising coupon on a stock it cannot shrink, and so cash yields less versus gold. Refinance part of the debt into 0% bills so the front end of the curve stops compounding interest expense. Let the gold price run, which is the market marking the dollar down against the one reserve asset that is not someone else’s liability. Then use existing Fed accounting rules (Section 2.10): the Treasury Secretary can instruct the Fed to revalue official gold from the statutory $42 an ounce to the new market price. That mark-to-market entry deposits several trillion, debt-free, into the Treasury General Account—the government’s checking account at the Fed. Use the cash to buy back the long end. The expensive stock of debt falls first. Only after the ratio is lower and the remaining debt is cheaper does a hotter nominal economy help. At that point 5–10% nominal growth raises the denominator faster than the remaining debt grows, instead of arriving as a rate shock that blows out interest expense. Skip that order and the same inflation still arrives—later, after a funding crisis, and at a higher social cost. If you try to grow or tighten first, the dollar rises, foreigners sell Treasuries, yields spike, and the Treasury is forced to monetize under duress. Bondholders pay either way: either through an organized devaluation against gold now, while rates are pinned and the long end is retired, or through a disorderly spike in yields and a weaker dollar after the market forces the issue. The first is repression. The second is a crisis. Gromen’s claim is that those are the only two endings once true interest expense already exceeds receipts. In that sequence the assets that work are the ones that reprice when the unit of account is being marked down and the long end of the Treasury curve is being retired. Physical gold is the core official tool in the mechanism itself. Bitcoin sits next as the privately held, bearer version of the same trade. The policy path above is a debasement-and-repression path. The portfolio that matches it is long the assets the official sector is forced to revalue, and short the duration it is forced to buy back (underweight long Treasuries).

StablecoinX (Nasdaq: $USDE) — not to be confused with Ethena’s USDe synthetic dollar — is the first digital-asset treasury vehicle in a long time that looks genuinely special. The stock has already started performing well, after positive updates regarding ENA value accrual and ENA supply unlocks. Even so, a straightforward re-rating remains on the table: USDE still trades at an mNAV of roughly 0.55x. Closing that discount to parity is, by itself, an attractive trade. The more interesting and exciting possibility is that this becomes more than a discount-to-MNAV story. If USDE begins to trade at a premium, the classic DAT flywheel can start to turn, which historically has yield explosive moves higher: ENA per share rises, treasury accumulation accelerates, ENA itself comes under bid, demand for the equity intensifies, ENA per share rises again. Rinse and repeat. That is the mechanism that once produced Strategy’s parabolic $BTC premium phase in $MSTR. The setup here is earlier, thinner, and still mispriced. The next two quarters should tell us whether the flywheel is real. There is also a genuine case that a sustained mNAV premium can form here for structural reasons Strategy never needed. @stablecoin_x sits on a mountain of Ethena's $ENA token — roughly 3.03 billion tokens, or about 20% of the 15 billion total supply and nearly 30% of the tokens now in circulation (for context Strategy topped around 4% of BTC supply). Meanwhile, the deepest pool of ENA liquidity remains concentrated on Binance and other offshore venues that are largely inaccessible to U.S. investors. USDE, by contrast, is a Nasdaq-listed wrapper, easily accessible for US persons. For U.S. allocators, it is the cleanest venue through which to take sizable exposure in ENA. That distinction matters. Strategy was a leveraged claim on BTC in a market where U.S. investors already had other ways to own the underlying, even if some still preferred or required to own an equity wrapper. USDE has an additional privilege: it can fill a liquidity and access void. If U.S. capital is forced to express the ENA thesis through the stock, that incremental demand can itself support a premium, feed the treasury flywheel, and keep the loop running. Taking the position while mNAV is still well below parity is a chance to get paid for the discount first — and still be in the seat if the premium parabolic phase materializes.

$USDe supply up another 100M $ENA up $USDE @stablecoin_x publicly traded stock, the ENA DAT and primary venue for ENA liquidity in the US, up on a day where markets are red Noticing

Beyond its utility of a replenishing $1/day of inference in perpetuity, $DIEM has the potential to be a real source of dollar yield. Today, it is already producing lumpy, variable dollar yield on a handful of platforms. I expect this market and demand to mature and become a more dependable, sustainable yield source in the future. If you, like Blackrock, think tokenized inference is the future then buying $VVV and staking to mint DIEM is worthy of consideration.

Where do we think this money flows that is pouring out of treasuries? Quality risk. Crypto will fly. $BTC $VVV $ENA $ZEC $HYPE