Matthew Dickie

Some thoughts on the prospects for a settlement of Russia's war against Ukraine. Mainstream thinking about the conflict largely revolves around when the war might end, how to pressure Russia into a ceasefire, and what a possible settlement could look like. We often hear that if the current attempt to advance the peace process fails, another window of opportunity may open in, say, six months. The problem is that we have been hearing this mantra about the "next six months" for almost five years now. My growing conviction is that there will be no lasting settlement of the conflict. A ceasefire may be possible, but it is likely to be partial, fragile and tactical, doing little to bring about sustainable peace. Instead, we should prepare for a prolonged period of deterioration and escalation across multiple fronts. This is not simply about the continuation of the war. It is about a broader, pervasive process of destabilisation, at least over the medium term. Ukraine is facing what could be its worst winter yet, amid mounting domestic pressures. I see little that could fundamentally change this trajectory. Even an unlikely settlement could — and probably would — accelerate domestic political conflicts and fuel instability. A ceasefire would bring elections closer, introducing another potential source of destabilisation. And I struggle to imagine any scenario in which any Ukrainian leadership would agree to Putin's terms for ending the conflict. Whatever agreement might eventually be signed, if one is signed at all, would risk remaining largely unimplemented, as happened with the Minsk agreements. Russia will not emerge stronger either. Financial and budgetary pressures, a struggling economy, increasingly frustrated elites, an unsettled society and unresolved geopolitical tensions — which would not disappear with a ceasefire or settlement and could even intensify — are likely to drive further domestic repression, erode Putin's authority and push elites to focus increasingly on their own survival, whatever the cost. The war has been steadily exhausting the Russian economy, and this process will continue. And this, too, may lead to less predictable and more dangerous geopolitical behaviour. Europe faces potentially pivotal elections in France. It is likely to become more divided, more fragile in its ability to provide financial and military support to Ukraine, and less coherent in its approach. Individual European states are already taking more initiative and gaining greater agency to act independently of Brussels institutions. Meanwhile, existing trends and persistent structural factors point towards an intensifying confrontation with Russia, growing sub-threshold threats, and an increasingly visible and tangible pattern of incidents and hybrid attacks. What appears to be a red line today may become the new normal tomorrow. And these red lines are shifting not only on the Russian side, but in Europe as well. The broader picture is that we have entered a protracted period of destabilisation, erosion of international rules and weakening of international institutions. As those institutions lose their ability to coordinate responses, individual countries are increasingly compelled to act on their own. But this growing fragmentation and lack of coordination will, in turn, further accelerate the deterioration. Any settlement in Ukraine risks being extremely fragile, while confrontation between Russia and Europe is likely to intensify regardless of developments on the Ukrainian track. This new reality may be with us for years, potentially until the accumulated escalation across multiple fronts reaches a peak that finally — and hopefully — forces all sides to sit down and engage in genuine dialogue. Until then, I believe we should prepare for the worst.