They call me bruce (@ringtrick) profile picture

If I don't respond it's because I've just gone ahead and muted you 🤷‍♂️

California
Joined March 2008
Photo by They call me bruce (@ringtrick)Photo by They call me bruce (@ringtrick)Photo by They call me bruce (@ringtrick)Photo by They call me bruce (@ringtrick)Photo by They call me bruce (@ringtrick)Photo by They call me bruce (@ringtrick)Photo by They call me bruce (@ringtrick)Photo by They call me bruce (@ringtrick)Photo by They call me bruce (@ringtrick)Photo by They call me bruce (@ringtrick)
ALLOW ME TO EXPLAIN!
I don't understand why so many people are so horrible to trans people
123
956
68
7,186
138,327
They call me bruce retweeted
I pulled the public orbital elements on all three satellites in the viral "SpaceX froze a NATO spy satellite so Russia could intercept it" brief and ran the numbers myself. The data shows two ordinary things happened. The explosive story welded onto them isn't supported, and in specific, checkable places it's flatly false. WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED (public Space-Track elements, SGP4): 1) A Russian inspector satellite, COSMOS 2612, made a close co-orbital approach to the commercial radar satellite ICEYE-X36. It closed to tens of meters at ~0 m/s on 16-18 Oct, then withdrew. Same orbital plane (incl 97.85°), and it actively maneuvered to get there. This is a real, notable Russian proximity operation. It required ZERO SpaceX involvement, because Russia tracks and maneuvers with its own sensors. 2) A Starlink (STARLINK-35856) had a routine conjunction with ICEYE-X36, ~0.45 km on 16 Oct 23:54 UTC. Real, but ordinary. Starlink sits in a totally different plane (incl 70° vs 98°), so this was a ~15 km/s crossing that lasts seconds. Every object in LEO gets these constantly. That's the whole factual content. Everything else is refuted by the data or isn't an orbital measurement at all. WHAT THE DATA REFUTES: ❌ "Intercept / immobilized / kill." All three satellites are on orbit and intact right now (elements epoch 25-26 Oct). ICEYE-X36 is alive and tracked. Cosmos 2612 withdrew to ~490 km and is still drifting away. A close approach that ends in withdrawal is an inspection, not a kinetic intercept. ❌ "X36 dodged a Russian approach in June, so it had to be frozen this time." Neither half happened. Cosmos 2612 never came within 50 km of X36 until 16 Oct. In June they were thousands of km apart. And X36 shows no June maneuver: smooth drag decay, with weekly averages falling from 546.1 to 545.0 km and a largest single step of -433 m (noise). A real 0.5 km avoidance burn would be a clean -500 m step. There is none. ❌ "SpaceX pinned/froze X36 in place." X36 never maneuvers, period. Over 165 days it deviates from its natural decay curve by no more than 278 m and holds inclination to 0.022°. There was nothing to "pin." It's a passively decaying microsat. For contrast, Cosmos 2612 shows a 47.8 km altitude burn in a single day. That is what a real maneuver looks like in the data. ❌ "SpaceX inflated the danger 5x, claiming the real distance was 1.9-2.0 km." Independent public elements give ~0.45 km for the Starlink pass, consistent with the ~0.4 km figure cited, not 1.9-2.0 km. That "5x safer" claim needs SpaceX's private ephemerides that no one outside SpaceX can see, and the public data points the opposite way. CREDIT WHERE DUE: the brief's raw archive numbers are real. The TLE update gaps and the conjunction time match my own pull. But multi-hour public TLE gaps are routine for every LEO object, and SpaceX having good space tracking is public knowledge used for collision avoidance. Neither is evidence of collusion. WHAT ORBITAL DATA CAN'T SETTLE: "coordination" with Russia, collision-alert intent, Starlink throttling, the 23% figure, Iran, finances. Those are assertions, not measurements. The brief's "99.9% probability" is that inference restated as a number, and several of its load-bearing inputs (the June evasion, the 5x inflation, "X36 could maneuver") are false, so it's garbage in. Orbital data can't prove a negative on intent. I can't prove no one coordinated. What I can show is that the data provides no evidence for it and contradicts the specific mechanisms claimed. Bottom line: a real Russian satellite inspection, which was already public and known, plus a routine Starlink flyby. Two unrelated events, one narrative bolted on top. All checks from public Space-Track two-line elements via SGP4. Happy to share the numbers.
SpaceX Blocked A U.S. And NATO Satellite to Assist a Russian Intercept After Crippling Ukraine's Air Defenses The Math Proves the Reality that Musk doesn't want you to see. On Oct 13-14, SpaceX restricted Starshield/Starlink during a 39-missile Russian attack, cutting Ukrainian drone intercepts by 23% and stranding U.S. personnel in Kyiv. Forty-eight hours later (Oct 15), SpaceX blocked U.S.-licensed NRO, Space Force, and NATO radar satellite ICEYE-X36 in orbit so Russia's COSMOS 2612 weapon could intercept it (99.89%-99.98% posterior) Our Model Demonstrates that the Russian intercept of the US/NATO ICEYE X-36 satellite (contemporaneous with the throttling of Starlink) would not have been possible, and almost certainly not been attempted, without SpaceX resources. At a material opportunity cost, Russia sprinted its COSMOS satellite to intercept ICEYE X36. Based on a previous attempt in June during which X36 maneuvered to evade COSMOS, Russia knew that this would be successful only if X36 could not maneuver. On October 15, SpaceX fixed X36 in place by issuing a collision alert for a sub-kilometer approach with its Starlink 35856 when SpaceX's own data shows that the actual distance was 4.8-5.0x as great. SpaceX issued no warning to COSMOS despite the fact that its sprint was far more threatening than the stable X36 orbit. SpaceX did not maneuver its Starlink 35856 satellite to clear the supposed collision risk. How, absent coordination with SpaceX, could Russia have known that SpaceX would take actions that (a) misrepresented the danger posed by X36, and (b) resulted in the fixing of X36 thereby enabling COSMOS's successful intercept? Thus, SpaceX was directly involved in simultaneously compromising Ukraine’s defensive and offensive capabilities. The conjunction of these two events makes innocent explanations untenable. The Pentagon Capture & Iran Round Two Trap: Pentagon CTO Emil Michael who cashed out $7M–$35M from Musk’s inner-circle SpaceX vehicles (M8/Gigafund 0.1 and M6/Valor M33 II) and KQ Partners / xAI (selling xAIfor $5M–$25M three days before taking over CDAO/OSCand 21 days before SpaceX bought xAI, while keeping M8, M6, M9, M10 & Nomadic open) and Pete Hegseth purged rival Anthropic in two hours, surrendered combat command over US drones used to attack Iran to Starlink’s "Terms of Service," and on October 2 named Musk Co-Director of Project Meridian to design the Pentagon's "Future of Warfighting" just as America enters Iran Round Twowith depleted Patriot/THAAD magazines and Russia feeding U.S. warship/aircraft locations to Tehran. SpaceX’s actions in Ukraine raise serious questions about its alignment with US security interests and its reliability as a cornerstone of US defense. These questions are particularly troubling given the effectively irreplaceable position SpaceX has been granted by the Hegseth/Emil Michael Pentagon. $SPCX $TSLA Our full quantitative analysis below w/ @streetwiseprof
13
70
20
421
38,372
They call me bruce retweeted
Replying to @codypd
1
6
612
They call me bruce retweeted
An organized disinformation campaign about Ukraine's Starlink access has dropped on Twitter. The richest man in the world needs bots and paid trolls for validation.
56
557
60
1,708
86,069
They call me bruce retweeted
Russians invaded Ukraine because they were imminently threatened by the idea of Ukraine joining an organization that would make it harder for them to invade Ukraine.
For real. But it’s not even just liberals, so many people on the left do this as well. Honestly, Russia is a huge litmus test for me. The whole situation is way more complicated than just regurgitating the establishment line of 'Russia bad' without looking at the broader context, and you cannot understand the crisis without looking at decades of NATO expansion. Like, are we actually analysing the world through a lens of global power structures, or are you just repeating what you see on the mainstream news?
48
325
8
4,741
95,697
They call me bruce retweeted
Starlink, Starshield, GPS, and the Claims About “Hacking”: A Technical Explanation A post accusing Ukraine of “hacking” #Starlink is spreading rapidly on this platform. The technical claims in that post are incorrect. They seem based on a collection of rumors circulating on Telegram, including information from Russian channels. Unfortunately, this post and others like it are receiving an enormous number of likes and reposts. That's why I believe it's important to address these claims with clear technical explanations rather than allow misleading information to spread unchecked. This is a fairly detailed post, but I think the distinction matters. Some of the technical information below comes from my own research and detailed analysis of Starlink terminal firmware, particularly its GPS, PNT, and velocity-processing systems. #⃣ 1. What are Starlink and Starshield? People still frequently confuse the two. Starlink is SpaceX's commercial satellite internet service, designed for consumers, businesses, and other commercial users. Starlink supports operation in motion, but the permitted speed depends on the service plan, equipment, and geographic region. Under commonly available commercial plans, the maximum authorized operating speed is 160 km/h (100 mph). In Ukraine, Starlink terminals are subject to a specific speed restriction: they cannot operate at speeds above approximately 75–80 km/h. This Ukraine-specific restriction was introduced less than a year ago, in coordination with Ukrainian authorities, to prevent Starlink terminals from being used on drones. Starshield is SpaceX's government-focused product and service family, based on Starlink technology and developed for national security applications. It includes secure communications, Earth observation, and hosted payload capabilities. Some Starshield systems involve dedicated government spacecraft and infrastructure. However, Starshield communications services can also use the underlying Starlink satellite network. This distinction is important: Starshield does not necessarily mean a completely separate physical satellite constellation or entirely different user terminal hardware. SpaceX develops and operates the underlying Starlink infrastructure. The U.S. government procures Starshield capabilities through contracts, with ownership and operational control depending on the particular system and arrangement. The division of authority between SpaceX and the U.S. government has become especially relevant following the October 2026 incident. Unlike ordinary commercial Starlink service, Starshield configurations used for military operations in Ukraine have supported substantially higher operating speeds. #⃣ 2. Is Starshield available in Ukraine? Yes. Starshield is operational in Ukraine and is extensively used by the Ukrainian military. Starshield service has been used in Ukraine since approximately mid-2023. Subsequent U.S. government contracts and public reporting also confirm its availability. The United States has procured Starshield services specifically to support Ukrainian military operations. An October 2026 U.S. Senate letter explicitly confirms that Ukraine receives Starshield services procured by the U.S. government. Therefore, the idea that Ukraine is somehow obtaining Starshield capabilities by secretly modifying commercial terminals fundamentally misunderstands how these services are provided. How does the Ukrainian military use these services? The Ukrainian military uses both commercial Starlink and Starshield. Commercial Starlink is widely used because of its availability, relatively low cost, and excellent performance. For stationary installations and many other applications, commercial service is entirely sufficient. Starshield is used for specialized military applications, including drones and other platforms requiring reliable connectivity at higher operating speeds. These are capabilities provided through the Starshield service itself, not necessarily through unauthorized modifications to commercial Starlink hardware. Using Starshield for its intended and authorized military applications is not inherently a violation of its service terms. #⃣ 3. Regarding the October 2026 incident Beginning on October 13–14, Ukrainian military units encountered unexpected speed restrictions affecting Starshield connectivity. Terminals that had previously operated at substantially higher speeds began losing connectivity at approximately 160 km/h, with some reports describing interruptions at even lower speeds. These restrictions disrupted military operations, particularly those involving high-speed unmanned systems. The consequences were serious. Ukrainian officials reported that the restrictions interfered with drone operations, including efforts to intercept russian attack drones. The decision-making process remains disputed. Neither SpaceX nor the U.S. government initially accepted responsibility for imposing the restrictions. Subsequent reporting and statements from U.S. lawmakers raised questions about who authorized the changes and which organization had the ability to implement them. As of October 24, Ukraine's Ministry of Defense has officially reported that Starlink/Starshield connectivity is once again stable at speeds exceeding 400 km/h. #⃣ 4. Does Starshield require separate hardware? Not necessarily. This is one of the most important points in the entire discussion. Starshield is a government-focused service and technology family. In the case of satellite communications provided to Ukraine, existing Starlink terminal hardware can be provisioned to use Starshield service. In December 2024, Bloomberg reported that a Pentagon contract would provide Starshield access to an additional 2,500 Starlink terminals already deployed in Ukraine, on top of 500 terminals previously covered. The contracts therefore provided service for a total of 3,000 terminals. In practice, compatible commercial Starlink hardware can be reassigned to Starshield service through the appropriate authorization and provisioning process. This requires approval. It is not something that a customer can simply enable through the ordinary Starlink application. Are there specialized Starshield terminals? Yes. For example, there is a specialized variant of the Starlink Mini known internally as `mini1_rugged`. Based on my hardware research, this model uses an improved GNSS receiver, the Teseo V, instead of the receiver found in the regular Mini. However, despite having repaired and examined numerous terminals and maintaining contact with people working with this equipment, I have not encountered evidence of this specific variant being supplied to Ukraine. The Starshield terminals I have encountered or received information about in Ukraine are based on regular Starlink hardware. Some terminals arrive already configured for Starshield service. Others can be provisioned for it through the appropriate channels. The key point is simple: A regular Starlink terminal operating under an authorized Starshield service configuration is still a Starshield terminal from the service perspective. It does not need to be physically modified or “hacked” to obtain that service. #⃣ 5. Why does a Starlink/Starshield terminal require GPS? Three years ago, I published an article explaining why GPS is important for Starlink terminals and how to improve GPS reception on the hardware available at that time: olegkutkov.me/2023/11/07/con… Some of the technical details in that article are now outdated, but the fundamental principles remain relevant. A Starlink terminal requires sufficiently accurate position and timing information for network synchronization, beamforming, and other aspects of normal operation. Location information can also be used for geographic service authorization. Invalid or spoofed GPS data may interfere with these processes. Depending on the magnitude of the error and the firmware's ability to detect it, the terminal may lose connectivity or become unable to operate normally. Modern firmware also includes mechanisms to detect suspicious or inconsistent GPS information. When GPS data is considered unreliable, the terminal may attempt to use an alternative source of positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) information derived from Starlink's own satellite constellation. However, this fallback mechanism is not guaranteed to work reliably under every operating condition. This distinction helps explain why some hardware modifications focus on improving GPS reception or supplying more reliable positioning data, rather than bypassing Starlink's network authorization mechanisms. #⃣ 6. What is Starlink PNT? Starlink PNT is a positioning, navigation, and timing capability that derives information from signals transmitted by Starlink satellites. By combining satellite measurements with known orbital information, a terminal can estimate its position and movement independently of a conventional GPS receiver. Starlink firmware contains the necessary functionality to process these measurements and use them as an alternative positioning source. Initially, this functionality was more of an experimental feature. It was interesting from an engineering perspective, but its accuracy and reliability were limited. Over time, it has improved significantly. Modern implementations can provide useful positioning information, including when a terminal is moving. There are still measurement errors, uncertainties, and limitations, but Starlink-derived PNT can serve as an alternative when GPS is unavailable or unreliable. Nevertheless, conventional GNSS remains an important and generally preferred source of positioning and timing information in current terminal designs. For now. Can the terminal operate without GPS? Under certain conditions, yes. Starlink firmware provides a gRPC request called `dish_inhibit_gps`, which controls whether GPS is used as a position source. When GPS use is inhibited, the firmware can attempt to rely on alternative positioning information. A similar situation occurs when GPS data becomes unavailable because of hardware or communication problems. However, disabling GPS does not guarantee that the alternative positioning solution will be sufficiently accurate or available. It also does not automatically change the terminal's service permissions. #⃣ 7. How does a Starlink terminal determine its moving speed? The GPS receiver is a primary source of position and velocity information. Proprietary NMEA messages, including `TMPV`, carry information the terminal's motion-processing logic uses. The firmware does not necessarily trust these measurements without additional validation. The firmware can filter GPS-derived velocity and compare it with information from other available sources, including Starlink-derived positioning. The terminal also contains an inertial measurement unit (IMU), whose acceleration measurements can help evaluate movement and detect inconsistencies. The firmware applies thresholds and consistency checks to these measurements. These mechanisms run internally and aren't exposed as user-configurable settings. If GPS measurements differ significantly from the expected values or fail validation, the firmware can reject them. However, GPS validation and service-speed enforcement are two different things. Rejecting GPS data does not automatically mean that the terminal has exceeded the permitted operating speed. The terminal's service configuration determines whether operation at a particular speed is authorized. When the relevant speed policy is violated, the terminal may report a condition such as: `MOVING_TOO_FAST_FOR_POLICY` This distinction is essential when evaluating claims about GPS modification. Simply changing GPS-reported velocity does not automatically change the terminal's authorized operating speed or eliminate the firmware's internal validation mechanisms. As explained earlier, appropriately provisioned Starshield service supports high-speed operation without the same restrictions imposed on ordinary commercial configurations. Therefore, no additional “hacking” is required to obtain high-speed capability when that capability is already authorized as part of the service. Reliable GNSS reception remains desirable, however. This is one reason specialized terminal designs may incorporate improved receivers, such as the Teseo V used in the `mini1_rugged` variant. It also explains the existence of solutions intended to improve GPS reception or provide a more reliable PNT input. **Improving positioning reliability is not the same thing as bypassing service authorization.** #⃣ 8. How does Starlink geofencing work? There are two important factors: geographic service authorization and physical RF coverage. Understanding the difference is essential. Geographic service authorization Starlink uses geographic information to determine where service is available and whether a particular terminal is authorized to operate. The system uses logical geographic regions rather than relying exclusively on the physical boundaries of satellite beams. H3 is one geographic indexing system relevant to this discussion. It divides the Earth's surface into hierarchical hexagonal cells that represent geographic locations and regions. Geographic indexing provides a convenient way to manage coverage and service policies, but an H3 cell should not be confused with a physical satellite beam. Network authorization can depend on several factors, including geographic location, service configuration, terminal identity, and applicable restrictions. A terminal may be physically capable of receiving a satellite signal while still being denied access to the service. This is an important distinction when discussing restricted territories, including russia. Receiving a Starlink signal does not necessarily mean the terminal is authorized to connect to the network. Physical RF coverage Satellite beams cannot perfectly follow national borders or the boundaries of geographic indexing cells. An RF beam has a physical footprint determined by the satellite antenna, beam steering, operating conditions, and geometry. Its boundaries are not perfectly sharp. Consequently, a beam may illuminate areas on both sides of a national border even though the service is authorized on only one side. This is a normal characteristic of satellite communications, not evidence that geographic service restrictions have been disabled. The role of GPS in geofencing The terminal's reported location provides another source of information for determining whether it is operating in an authorized region. The network can use terminal positioning information, together with its own authorization rules, to determine whether service should be permitted. When operation is prohibited, the terminal may receive an appropriate disablement code from the network. These mechanisms should be understood as parts of a broader service authorization system, rather than as a single GPS check controlling everything. Can geofencing be bypassed by supplying modified GPS coordinates? This question requires some nuance. Changing the location reported by a GPS receiver may influence positioning-dependent decisions, but it does not automatically override network authorization. Starlink also has other information available to evaluate terminal operation, and its firmware includes mechanisms for detecting inconsistent positioning data. Large discrepancies can disrupt normal positioning and beamforming calculations, trigger validation failures, or cause the terminal to lose connectivity. Most importantly, changing GPS coordinates does not by itself grant a terminal permission to use a service or geographic region for which it is not authorized. #⃣ 9. So what exactly is being called a “Starlink hack”? This is where much of the confusion comes from. The modifications being discussed online are primarily related to improving GPS reception or providing the terminal with reliable positioning and timing information. These are technical solutions intended to improve connectivity and stability, particularly when the terminal is moving or operating in an environment with GPS interference. They do not automatically bypass Starlink's speed restrictions, geographic limitations, or network authorization mechanisms. As explained earlier, regular Starlink hardware can also operate under an officially authorized Starshield service configuration, which supports high-speed military applications. Neither improving GPS reliability nor using an authorized Starshield service constitutes hacking Starlink. It's important to understand these differences before making accusations based on photographs, rumors, or incomplete technical information. #⃣ Conclusion Starlink and Starshield use closely related technologies, but they are different services with different capabilities and restrictions. Regular Starlink hardware can operate under an officially authorized Starshield service configuration. No special hardware modifications are required. Improving GPS reception or providing reliable positioning data does not mean bypassing Starlink's network restrictions. Using Starshield for authorized military operations is not hacking. Neither is improving a terminal's GPS reliability. My goal is simply to explain how these systems work and clear up the confusion surrounding them. Technical accusations should be based on evidence, not rumors. #starlink #starshield #gps
104
353
119
1,162
145,833
They call me bruce retweeted
I guess the viral claim sourced to a 600-follower account in Moscow about how 160 kph WAS the max speed and Ukr had violated Starshield TOS by jerry-rigging the circuit boards, only to then launch an anti-Trump/Musk info op after being discovered, was inaccurate.
Monitoring systems of Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence have officially confirmed the restoration of Starlink/Starshield operational speeds, with connectivity remaining stable at speeds exceeding 400 kph. We are grateful to everyone who helped restore the service and for your important contribution to saving Ukrainian lives. Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence will continue monitoring performance, as reliable Starlink/Starshield connectivity plays a critical role in intercepting Russian drones and protecting Ukrainian lives.
8
18
60
4,877
They call me bruce retweeted
EXCLUSIVE: Macklemore debuts Free Palestine anthem about his resuscitated career.
34
36
11
341
46,922
They call me bruce retweeted
Draw me like one of your French girls
164
3,865
180
51,726
1,068,363
They call me bruce retweeted
"We have plundered everything in the name of Allah". Mohammad himself could not have said it better.
138
1,098
179
3,562
59,789
They call me bruce retweeted
This one he's boasting about the plunder he got, congratulating the young'uns for having destroyed everything and mocking the LEO. HE KNOWS HE'S SAFE.
7
25
2
85
23,478
Voici François-Louis Artois d’Hauteville, 15 ans, un jeune Français issu d’une ancienne lignée normande. Il manifeste contre le manque de professeurs de philosophie dans son établissement — sa matière de prédilection. L’an dernier, un remplaçant a dû condenser en un seul semestre, à marche forcée, l’ensemble du programme consacré à Hegel et à Kant. François a été le seul de sa classe à tenir le rythme : il avait déjà lu La Phénoménologie de l’esprit. Ses camarades, eux, peinaient à suivre, découvrant à peine cette œuvre en parallèle de la Critique de la raison pure. Il a bien tenté de les aider après les cours, mais ces séances empiétaient sur ses engagements bénévoles dans une maison de retraite et sur ses leçons de violoncelle. Voilà pourquoi, sur cette photo, il consulte sur son téléphone un cours consacré à la lecture des partitions et aux fondements de la musique classique.😇🇫🇷
1,187
5,262
363
37,759
1,314,859
Estudiantes franceses reivindicando más horas de clase de matemáticas
301
2,330
198
9,213
194,710
They call me bruce retweeted
Not to blackpill but I need to say something. My parents are boomer libs and I asked them if they heard about what's happening in France and they said: "Oh yeah, we heard there are big student protests over the education and class sizes."
255
808
98
8,654
283,699
They call me bruce retweeted
We call on France to exercise restraint when dispersing the freedom fighters on the streets of Paris. These brave warriors for justice must receive immediate humanitarian aid, and their safety must be guaranteed in accordance with international law. Failure to comply will leave us no choice but to bring a case before the ICJ, in close cooperation with that renowned champion of human rights, Afghanistan.
3,280
13,836
2,250
94,746
4,740,603
They call me bruce retweeted
It's so exciting to be getting a movie that is stylistically indistinguishable from the movies we've been watching for the last 15 years!
The visuals of Greta Gerwig's ‘NARNIA’. In theaters on February 12, 2027.
30
93
25
1,334
70,170
They call me bruce retweeted
Just so you understand the scale of betrayal: first, our "partners" didn't warn Ukraine about the incoming ballistic missiles, so the air raid alert wasn't activated before impact, robbing people of their chance to survive. ​Then, Starlink was restricted to stop working at speeds above 100 mph. This renders useless, first and foremost, our interceptor drones. It doesn't limit our ability to attack inside Russia, it limits our ability to stop another apartment building or school full of civilians from being hit. ​Wow, just wow.
950
5,057
242
18,574
311,573
They call me bruce retweeted
Greta Gerwig’s $280M ‘NARNIA’ is reportedly raising concerns at Netflix after a test screening, with insiders calling the film “awful”. The production has undergone reshoots amid those concerns. (theinsneider.com/p/greta-ger…)
770
619
730
11,098
1,948,016
They call me bruce retweeted
Walking into the gym after Shane Gillis' SNL joke 💀
204
1,064
66
22,670
1,293,580
They call me bruce retweeted
I didn’t chime in on this because a) I honestly didn’t care that much and b) there are usually two sides to these things. But the way this went, as best I can tell, is that Kelly Clarkson walked into this Brooklyn store, voluntarily looking a bit homeless, and inquired about a fake bird. In between helping a ton of other people, they told her the bird was not for sale but here is the artist’s info, he sells them for about $15,000. In the meantime, here is a $2,000 bird they DO offer. Which Clarkson took to mean, “You can’t afford our bougie bird that costs as much as a baby grand so here, take this pathetic $2,000 knock-off like good little poor.” (Which is a stupid interpretation all around because who but a rich person has $2k to drop on a fake bird? But okay.) Anyway, that was not the intended message, but she immediately walked out and put this little business on blast to her millions of followers who instantly swarmed like bees with zero additional information. I don’t give a crap whether Clarkson ends up with a fake bird or how much it costs. She can have a menagerie of $20,000 parakeets or she can whittle them herself out of sticks from her backyard, I don’t care. But I do care that so many people can be instantly riled up on social media to attack a potentially innocent person or business simply because their celebrity idol tells them to.
The @kellyclarkson tapes are OUT! And guess what? The footage shows NO evidence of her being disparaged. What it DOES show is her looking at the bird, staff assisting otherS, and Kelly having an outburst as she leaves - and other customers clearly uncomfortable by her conduct.
543
922
79
14,433
1,747,729