Angus Martin

Morgenthau: A realist ethic | Ved Shinde ift.tt/Jk2t8Zm

The Middle East Is Once Again Approaching a Moment of Decision: Can Washington and Tehran Reach a Deal Before Another War? As Qatar intensifies its diplomatic efforts to broker an agreement between the United States and Iran, one thing is becoming increasingly clear: the risk of another military confrontation remains high, but the possibility of a diplomatic breakthrough should not be dismissed. At the same time, if the current negotiations collapse, the likelihood of renewed escalation could increase dramatically. To understand where things are heading, we need to recognize several important factors. First, neither Washington nor Tehran necessarily wants another war. Both would, in principle, prefer a diplomatic solution that protects their fundamental interests. But neither appears willing to make the concessions the other side considers essential, and both seem prepared to accept the risks of military confrontation rather than compromise on what they regard as core national interests. Second, There are regional actors, particularly Qatar, that have both the motivation and the diplomatic channels necessary to influence the two sides. The Gulf states have compelling reasons to prevent another war. They understand that any major confrontation with Iran could quickly spread beyond Iranian territory, threatening their own security, energy infrastructure, and economic stability. Their involvement therefore represents an important opportunity for diplomacy. Yet the obstacles remain enormous. The fundamental problem is not simply the disagreement over the nuclear issue. It is the profound lack of trust between Washington and Tehran. Each side expects the other to make the first meaningful concession. Both are using military pressure to strengthen their negotiating positions. The talks remain indirect, and the two governments have fundamentally different interpretations of the strategic balance and what the previous rounds of fighting actually achieved. From Tehran's perspective, there is another critical consideration. The last two negotiating processes were followed by American and/or Israeli military strikes. This experience has reinforced the Iranian leadership's suspicion that diplomacy could once again serve as a cover for military preparations. Consequently, Iranian negotiators are not merely seeking American commitments. They want credible guarantees that those commitments will actually be implemented. This is where Qatar's diplomatic challenge becomes particularly complicated. The objective is to construct an agreement that allows both sides to claim victory. For Tehran, this means demonstrating that Washington has fulfilled Iran's seven conditions and that its resistance to American military and economic pressure has produced tangible results. For the Trump administration, it means securing a meaningful Iranian nuclear commitment that President Trump can present as proof that his pressure campaign succeeded in preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. In theory, these objectives are not necessarily incompatible. A carefully structured agreement, with clearly defined sequencing, reciprocal commitments, and credible implementation mechanisms, could potentially bridge at least some of the differences. One possibility is an interim ceasefire arrangement that creates additional diplomatic space for more substantive negotiations. But such an arrangement would only be useful if it establishes a credible pathway toward resolving the underlying disputes. Otherwise, it would merely postpone the next confrontation rather than prevent it. The challenge, therefore, is not only reaching an agreement on paper. It is ensuring that the agreement survives its first encounter with political and strategic reality. Even if negotiators manage to formulate a set of understandings, the depth of mutual suspicion could undermine their implementation almost immediately. Every delay, every ambiguous commitment, and every military move could be interpreted as evidence that the other side is negotiating in bad faith. There is also a dangerous psychological dimension to the current crisis. Both Washington and Tehran appear to believe that their military capabilities provide them with significant leverage. Both may also calculate that another round of fighting could improve their negotiating positions. This creates a particularly dangerous situation in which neither side necessarily seeks war, but both may convince themselves that escalation is preferable to accepting an unfavorable agreement. But, there is little reason to believe that another military confrontation would automatically produce better diplomatic conditions. Washington may hope that additional strikes would force Tehran to reconsider its position, but the Iranian leadership has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to absorb considerable military and economic costs rather than accept what it perceives as capitulation. Yes, another war could make negotiations even more difficult, particularly if Iran responds with a broader regional campaign that raises the costs for the United States and its Gulf partners. For now, the balance still tilts toward escalation, particularly if the Qatari-led diplomatic initiative fails. But this is not an inevitable outcome. As long as the diplomatic channels remain open and both sides continue exploring possible compromises, there is still a realistic opportunity to reach an understanding. The difficulty is that time is running short, expectations remain fundamentally incompatible, and mutual distrust is so deeply entrenched that even an agreement in principle could collapse during implementation. Ultimately, two questions will determine the outcome. Can Washington and Tehran reach an agreement that allows each side to believe it has prevailed without requiring the other to surrender its fundamental interests? And perhaps more importantly, do decision-makers in Washington genuinely believe that another round of military escalation would produce a better agreement, despite the considerable risk that Tehran would respond by escalating rather than capitulating? These questions are particularly important because, from the Iranian leadership's perspective, another confrontation would not necessarily change its fundamental negotiating position. If anything, a more destructive war could reinforce its determination not to yield under military pressure. The Middle East is once again approaching a critical crossroads. Diplomacy remains possible, but the window for achieving a sustainable agreement may be narrowing. The greatest danger is not that either side necessarily wants another war. It is that both may come to believe that another war is the only remaining way to achieve the agreement they want. #IranWar #iran

“If people feel like our values don’t matter anymore—our values as war fighters, our values as Americans—then they’re not going to be there when we need them,” says William McRaven. foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/…

My new book - out on October 22nd.

“Whoever produces and controls frontier models acquires global leverage over innovation, production, science, culture, and, ultimately, advanced thought.” Read @nfergus, Lisa Klaassen, and @ericschmidt on the imperial nature of AI: foreignaffairs.com/china/emp…

What if Washington asked Australia why it sells iron ore to China? Economist John Edwards tells @SamRoggeveen Australia would refuse to choose, because its economic ties with China matter far more than those with the US. 👉Watch the podcast here: youtu.be/3bgsF4jC394

The geostrategic case for compute in Australia: Janet Egan (@janet_e_egan) has been doing a bunch of quiet work trying to nudge Australian policymakers to think more seriously about AI. She works at the Center for a New American Security in Washington, but was back home in Australia over the past month. Was lucky to catch her on the day before she returned to the US. We pressure-test various strategic arguments for a large-scale compute industry and talk about the steps we would need to take to enable it. Watch below, or wherever you get your podcasts! Timestamps: (0:00:00) – Introduction (0:00:33) – Lessons from the AdBlue crisis (0:09:02) – How seriously do Australian policymakers take AI? (0:12:48) – How much does frontier access matter? (0:28:55) – Compute-for-access (0:43:08) – What does sufficient leverage look like? (0:53:00) – What does AI sovereignty actually mean? (1:03:15) – Taiwan, undersea cables and data centres as military targets (1:10:30) – Could compute buy Australia influence over AI safety? (1:15:19) – Verifying international AI agreements (1:24:00) – Copyright: the red line? (1:37:49) – The maximally ambitious path

1: I’m a little sad to say that after 20 years, The Business (which started off as Lateline Business) has been cancelled. The final episode will air on 10 December. I had a lot of fun filing TV stories for this program, guest-hosting it over the years…