S Sebag Montefiore (@simonmontefiore) header
S Sebag Montefiore (@simonmontefiore) profile picture

Historian.The Cauldron: the Making of the Modern Middle East. CatherineII. StalinRedTsar. YgStalin. Jerusalem. Romanovs. TheWorld. Novelist: The Moscow Trilogy

london
Joined March 2012
Photo by S Sebag Montefiore (@simonmontefiore)Photo by S Sebag Montefiore (@simonmontefiore)Photo by S Sebag Montefiore (@simonmontefiore)Photo by S Sebag Montefiore (@simonmontefiore)Photo by S Sebag Montefiore (@simonmontefiore)Photo by S Sebag Montefiore (@simonmontefiore)Photo by S Sebag Montefiore (@simonmontefiore)Photo by S Sebag Montefiore (@simonmontefiore)Photo by S Sebag Montefiore (@simonmontefiore)Photo by S Sebag Montefiore (@simonmontefiore)
The Cauldron is coming to USA & Canada. It is out in hardback audio & kindle 29 September. Just a little later than in UK. Do preorder. Do enjoy. Do discuss. I m coming to launch in NYC. @wnbooks @AAKnopf
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excellent picture!!
💥In the real world, Yair Golan met today with Mansour Abbas and "expressed their commitment to working swiftly and decisively to form a government of reform and national rescue for Israel, recognizing the gravity of their responsibility and the opportunity created by the election results."
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A review of The Cauldron @ft today: “A riveting look at the cultures, ideas and maddening complexity that made the modern region, both incredibly erudite and marvellously well written; the book sings…. it is a riveting deeply absorbing work that stands out for the grand vistas that it opens up before diligent readers….” @DrRadchenko @wnbooks @Ed_Critica @KlettCottaTweet @CappelenDamm @Planetadelibros and @AAKnopf
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Elif Eralp möchte Regierende Bürgermeisterin Berlins werden. Doch in einem internen Vermerk zeigt die Linkenpolitikerin, dass sie sich vor Terrorsympathisanten mit Kontakten zur Hamas fürchtet. Kann so jemand für die Sicherheit in der Hauptstadt verantwortlich… Link in X-Bio.
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As an ex-foreign resident of Kfar Kama I'd like to contribute to voting patterns of Circassians of Israel that can help with minority politics in Israel. Before starting, Eisenkot and M.Abbas has some popularity recently, where popularity of Abbas is surprising as generally Arab politicians are not popular among Circassians. Ra'am seems to do better all over the country at the moment. The important qualification when discussing the "Circassian votes" in Israel is that Kfar Kama and Rihaniya should not simply be combined and treated as one electoral unit and put into the same basket with "Muslim votes". Kfar Kama is fully Circassian (except one ethnic Arab family who speaks the language and culturally Circassian today) while Rihaniya has around %40 Palestinian-Arab minority (started with one family but numbers grew A LOT). Circassians are not Arabs and have nothing in common except religion. Unlike Arabs Circassians mostly serve in IDF, fully integrated to Israel in all sense since 1948. Reasons of their alliance with Jews in 48' has some reasons, mostly due to tense Circassian-Arab relations but let's keep it aside for the moment. In 2022, Kfar Kama voted 28.8% Yesh Atid, 22.2% National Unity and 19.8% Ra’am, while only 1.8% voted Yisrael Beiteinu. Rihaniya, by contrast, gave 23.4% to National Unity, 18.7% to Yesh Atid and 18.3% to Yisrael Beiteinu. Arab parties together received roughly 23% in Kfar Kama and 21% in Rihaniya. That last comparison matters. Even though Rihaniya contains a sizeable Arab population whereas Kfar Kama is overwhelmingly Circassian, the total Arab-party vote was actually slightly higher in Kfar Kama, since Rihaniya Arabs, after living long year with dominant Circassian socio-political atmosphere, their voting patterns also has became similar. Historically, both villages have leaned heavily toward Labor and later centrist but they have repeatedly differed in important ways. Rihaniya has shown a much stronger Yisrael Beiteinu tendency, while Kfar Kama has often concentrated more heavily around mainstream centrist parties. Rihaniya has also consistently recorded substantially higher turnout. Ethnicity and electoral identity are not interchangeable variables. Israeli Circassians are Muslim without being Arab, strongly preserve a separate Circassian national-cultural identity, participate extensively in Israeli state institutions and military service, and nevertheless distribute their votes across Zionist centrist, left-wing, Russian-oriented and Arab parties. This is due to an extreme level of democratic mentality among Circassians and liberty to discuss anything without facing discrimination. Last week a friend of mine laughed aloud when he told me about his wife's favourite party this time, where she'll vote for the first time to extreme left. We still make jokes to her and laugh together. In other words, there is no single, politically completely uniform "Circassian vote" . The contrast between Kfar Kama and Rihaniya is a particularly good example of why Israel’s minority politics has to be analysed through ethnicity, locality, civic integration and historical experience simultaneously, rather than through religion alone.
Fun fact: Israel is home to two predominantly Muslim, non-Arab communities: Kfar Kama and Rehaniya, founded by Circassian exiles in the 19th century. And their voting patterns are quite distinctive 👇
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Wer Fragen zum Namen Eisenkot hat 👇
Eisenkot (n) – surname, orig. North Africa From Berber aznkʷḍ (“gazelle; young noble man”). Compare Moroccan Arabic أزنكض (ʔazenkaḍ), إزنكاض (ʔizenkāḍ) Spelling likely distorted by clerks upon immigrants' arrival in Israel due to similarity to German/Yiddish "eisen" (iron)
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The Gulf states aren’t just buyers of US weapons anymore. The UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar are all pushing to build defence systems at home, with Saudi Arabia targeting over 50% localisation by 2030. Will that turn diplomatic activism into real strategic independence? @RanjAlaaldin weighs the evidence in the latest #RUSICommentary. rusi.org/explore-our-researc…
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Is America really retreating from the Middle East? And are we witnessing a genuine redistribution of power? In my article for @RUSI_org, I challenge the idea that we are entering a post-American Middle East. The Iran war has highlighted the constraints facing middle powers and shown why perceptions of American retreat can be misleading. The article examines emerging regional security arrangements such as the Mecca Pact, drawing on history and parallels with Europe, where ambitions for strategic autonomy have not changed the reality of continued dependence on U.S. military supremacy. But the war could pave the way for indigenous defence industries, which would reduce dependence on the U.S. and underpin the diplomatic reach of the Gulf states, making autonomy more credible and durable.
The Gulf states aren’t just buyers of US weapons anymore. The UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar are all pushing to build defence systems at home, with Saudi Arabia targeting over 50% localisation by 2030. Will that turn diplomatic activism into real strategic independence? @RanjAlaaldin weighs the evidence in the latest #RUSICommentary. rusi.org/explore-our-researc…
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Replying to @simonmontefiore @FT
I'm reading it now and it's great
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I can’t stress this enough: The shift in Israeli discourse of political legitimacy is new and real. Never before had coalition with Arab parties been discussed so openly, and old taboos reexamined. More so than in 2021-22, when Bennet and Lapid joined forces with Mansour Abbas. It will be a battle, of course, but full Jewish-Arab political alliance is finally on the mainstream agenda.
Replying to @BernardBessis
What’s new and encouraging is that Arab participation in the government is finally normalized in mainstream Israeli discourse.
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It’s fascinating watching the penny drop with all these left wing parties, as they realise they’ve been infiltrated by extremist entryists but their own suicidal ideology won’t allow them to call it out.
סיפור די מטורף מברלין: אליף אראלפ, שאמורה להיות ראשת העיר של בירת גרמניה, העניקה ראיון ל"שפיגל". כמו שמקובל בעיתונות הגרמנית (ומאוד מגונה), הכתבים העבירו לה את הראיון ל"אאטוריזירונג", אישור של הדברים שבו למרואיין יש את היכולת לשכתב חלק מתשובותיו. אלא כשהכתבים פתחו את המסמך...
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Of course @RepJoshG is right that @AbdulElSayed should condemn the ad. But to do so would invalidate a core antisemitic theme of his entire campaign, which is why El-Sayed is remaining eerily silent about the ad.
This ad is vile antisemitism, plain and simple. Abdul El-Sayed needs to stop hiding. He must condemn it, and tell his friend to take it down. Scapegoating Jews is one of the oldest tropes in the book, and it has led to violence from the pogroms to the Holocaust to our communities today. Silence isn’t leadership. Abdul needs to call out this hate. No excuses, no hiding.
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Very funny to see how pliant MP’s were in the teeth of Nus Ghani’s gentle scoldings.
"Behave better than your children!" "You’ve let your daughter down..." Nus Ghani had to channel her inner school teacher to control unruly MPs during the Budget.
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I don’t know, guys. If you don’t look at Arab politics and see fundamentally different rhetoric and strategies from 20 years ago, then you aren’t actually looking at Arab politics. You’re just reading Likud talking points about it. There’s a massive anti-Israel and anti-Zionist sentiment in the Arab street. Probably 60% of Arab political representation openly represents that sentiment. And also, there’s a powerful and growing demand to join coalitions, including with the right, to work with state institutions, to integrate into Israeli mainstream society, and so on. Arab political parties that leave aside their ideological uniqueness and unite in a demand for a seat at the table always improve turnout in the Arab street. Always. For eight elections in a row now, that rule has held. Raam has grown dramatically, specifically because it brought a Zionist Jew into its list as its crime czar and promised its voters to tackle real world problems by working *with* Israeli state institutions, instead of against them. It is entirely possible for the Arabs of Israel to both feel deeply Palestinian, deeply wary of Israel’s Jewishness, and deeply desiring of greater integration with their Jewish neighbors. Don’t let anyone make excuses for the many anti-Israel radicals in those lists. But also, it’s simply a lie to pretend that the new and growing desire to integrate isn’t happening. Welcome to real life, where two seemingly opposite things can be taking place at once.
Replying to @havivrettiggur
Arab voters want integration, which is why it's never reflected in anything they actually do and all the parties they actually vote for favor the Palestinian identity. The average Arab citizen regards himself as a Palestinian, however inconvenient that is for liberal Zionists.
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Great to talk to wonderful audience at @CanterburyFest tonight. Thanks for having me @wnbooks
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I’m not a betting man, but my money is on fresh elections in the spring. Even if the opposition were willing to break a taboo and accept a unity government, Netanyahu knows it’s because they have no better options—and would have worse options after fresh elections. Even flirting with the idea of a minority government is dangerous, because of what it means in fresh elections. Netanyahu remains caretaker prime minister. His interest is another vote.
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This is what happens when you have an inexplicable but inexorable need to be an expert on everything but don't know jack sh** about the matter at hand. You end up just repeating the seemingly intelligent or enlightened, but nevertheless foolish, platitudes put out by other ignoramuses. It's not ethnicity preventing the Eisenkott-led bloc from joining with the Arab parties. Let's break this down: The Arab parties are divided between the Joint List, comprising Hadash, Ta’al, and Balad, and Mansour Abbas's Ra’am. Their differences are substantial, particularly concerning Israel's Jewish identity and participation in Zionist-led governments. The Joint List is explicitly anti-Zionist. Its platform rejects the Zionist political consensus, identifies Arab citizens as part of the Palestinian national community, and advocates fundamental changes to Israel's national and constitutional character. Hadash includes the Israeli Communist Party, while Balad is a secular Palestinian nationalist faction. Ra’am has adopted a more pragmatic approach. Abbas has repeatedly acknowledged Israel's permanent Jewish identity while rejecting Zionism as his own political ideology. His party seeks greater Arab equality, integration, and political influence within Israel's existing institutions. Its inclusion of Jewish Zionist politician Yoav Segalovitz as its second-ranked candidate is a significant expression of that approach. These differences matter because most of the Jewish opposition is unwilling to form a government with the Joint List, and some members also oppose relying on Ra’am. But Ra'am also only has six-seven seats, and wouldn't be enoug to form a government. Bennett and Lieberman have ruled out governing with Arab parties because of these fundamental divergences (Bennett has made clear repeatedly it is their stances and not their identity that is at issue). They have also ruled out sitting with ultra-Orthodox Jewish parties over similar or identical divergences. Eisenkot has established conditions involving recognition of Israel's Jewish and democratic identity and universal service. Perhaps the most consequential disagreement concerns universal military or national service, one of the central issues confronting Israeli society. The Joint List's platform rejects compulsory military and civilian service and supports voluntary community service instead. Its opposition reflects a fundamentally different understanding of Israel's security requirements and the relationship between Arab citizens and the state. The Joint List does not share the Jewish mainstream's understanding of the IDF as the institution principally responsible for Israel's national survival. Rather, its political platform characterizes Israeli military activity primarily through the lens of occupation, war, and Palestinian national rights. Its economic program explicitly advocates deep cuts in military spending and ending the financing of Israeli military operations in Gaza and territories it considers occupied in Lebanon, Syria, and the Palestinian territories. The practical effect of these positions would be to reduce the IDF's resources and military activity, rather than expand its capabilities and manpower as the Jewish mainstream considers necessary. Elements within Hadash have also historically expressed positions sympathetic to Israel's adversaries. In 2007, Ayman Odeh, then Hadash secretary-general, declared that Hezbollah was not the enemy of Israel's Arab citizens, but that Israeli occupation was. In 2016, the head of Hadash's Communist Party faction celebrated the Assad regime's capture of Aleppo, although Odeh subsequently disavowed support for Assad. These positions help explain the profound ideological differences between the Joint List and Israel's mainstream Jewish parties. This opposition extends even to conscripting ultra-Orthodox Jews. The Joint List explicitly opposes drafting Haredim, rejecting the premise that Israel needs more soldiers. During a June 2024 Knesset debate, Ahmad Tibi declared: "We oppose drafting Haredim and Arabs." This is a significant divergence with the Zionist opposition to Netanyahu: unlike the Zionist opposition, the Joint List does not regard increasing IDF manpower as a desirable objective in itself. There is also a potential political domino effect. If compulsory military or national service becomes an obligation applicable to all Jewish Israelis, including Haredim, that would strengthen demands to extend the same obligation to Arab citizens. The Joint List therefore has an additional reason to resist even Haredi conscription: preserving existing exemptions helps it resist the broader principle of universal service. This is a plausible political consideration, although the party has not publicly identified it as its reason for opposing Haredi enlistment. Ra’am also opposes mandatory military or civilian service for Arab citizens, but supports developing voluntary civilian-service frameworks suited to Arab communities. Crucially, Ra’am has not established a categorical position against drafting Haredim. Three Ra’am MKs supported a Haredi conscription bill in January 2022. The party declined to state its position on Haredi conscription when questioned during the 2026 campaign. Eisenkot's proposal is broader: military or civilian service for all citizens, including Haredim and Arabs. His platform therefore conflicts with both Arab parties' opposition to compulsory Arab service. Even if an Eisenkot government received Arab-party support, that would not guarantee sufficient parliamentary support for universal service. A narrower Haredi conscription law might attract different voting coalitions, but a genuinely universal service requirement would face substantial opposition from the very parties Eisenkot might need to remain in power.
When it's convenient, #Israel trumpets loudly the fact that Arabs can vote in its elections. But when Arabs win a record number of seats, the idea of joining hands with them is inconveivable. Will the "Change" Coalition bring action to realize its name -- or is it just a word?
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1/3 Turkey builds Asia-Europe rail corridor as wars snarl up old trade routes, receiving financing from EU to Asian multinational banks. Türkiye's Transport Minister @a_uraloglu told @NikkeiAsia, Turkey will complete its own missing links by 2031, investing $10 bln. asia.nikkei.com/business/tra…
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🚨 SUMMARY: The OBR forecasts following John Healey's Budget - Welfare spending will rise to £431.3bn by 2030/31 - an increase of £97.5bn a year in cash terms - This includes £209.8bn on pensioner benefits, £110.7bn on Universal Credit, £69.6bn on disability benefits, £13.9bn on Child Benefit and £27.2bn on other welfare - Inflation will peak at 3.75% in early 2027, up from the earlier prediction of 2% - UK GDP growth will slow from around 1.25% in 2026 to 1% in 2027, before climbing to 1.6% in 2031 - Average UK unemployment will rise to 5.1% across 2026 and 2027 - The Employment Rights Act will "likely" have a negative economic impact because of reduced flexibility and greater uncertainty for businesses - The landlord tax increases (property income) could contribute to a long-term rise in private rents and discourage landlords from entering the market - Real household disposable income per person will be around 0.75% lower in 2030-31 than it expected in March 2026 - Higher earnings and frozen tax thresholds will increase income tax and National Insurance receipts by £9bn in 2026-27 and around £8bn on average in subsequent forecast years compared with March - Net migration is forecast to fall to 120,000 in the year to mid-2026, then gradually rise to 230,000 by the year to mid-2031 - Nominal weekly earnings growth will slow to around 3.5% in 2026, then average roughly 2.25% a year - Andy Burnham's first-time buyer scheme could raise house prices by increasing demand without enough new homes being built
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