Damian Morley

Let us remind ourselves of a little political history that James Cleverly ought to know better than most. James Cleverly was a Conservative member of the London Assembly throughout Boris Johnson’s mayoralty and subsequently became Chairman of the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority, succeeding Brian Coleman, another prominent figure in Johnson’s administration and a convicted criminal. Although Cleverly chaired the fire authority rather than the police authority, he was nevertheless part of the Conservative establishment at City Hall during a period in which the Metropolitan Police suffered substantial reductions in funding, civilian staffing and operational support. And the figures deserve to be remembered. Between March 2010 and March 2016, the Metropolitan Police lost 4,658 civilian staff, a reduction of almost 33 per cent. Over the same period, the number of Police Community Support Officers fell by a further 3,019. Taken together with reductions in warranted officers, these figures represented the loss of nearly 9,000 members of the Metropolitan Police workforce. These were not simply administrative luxuries or unnecessary bureaucratic positions. They were the people who supported investigations, intelligence gathering, custody arrangements, operational planning and the countless essential functions that allowed trained police officers to concentrate on policing London's streets. Anyone with the slightest understanding of how a major emergency service operates should appreciate that removing such substantial numbers of support staff does not magically eliminate the work they performed. Those responsibilities remain, and when there are insufficient civilian personnel to undertake them, the burden inevitably falls elsewhere, potentially drawing warranted officers away from the very frontline duties politicians claim to be protecting. And let us be absolutely clear about where responsibility lay. The Metropolitan Police is not solely accountable to the Mayor of London. Its governance involves a statutory relationship between the Commissioner, the Mayor and the Home Secretary. The Home Office exercises significant responsibilities for national policing policy, central government funding and national security, while the Home Secretary also has a direct role in the appointment and accountability of the Metropolitan Police Commissioner. During the period in question, London had a Conservative Mayor in Boris Johnson and a Conservative Home Secretary in Theresa May. Both occupied positions of considerable authority within the Metropolitan Police's governance arrangements. Indeed, both were directly involved in the appointment of Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe as Metropolitan Police Commissioner in 2011. The financial framework within which the Metropolitan Police operated was therefore shaped by Conservative decisions at both City Hall and Westminster. Responsibility cannot conveniently be attributed to one institution while ignoring the statutory powers and financial decisions of the other. James Cleverly was not some distant observer of that administration. He was part of it. He sat within the political establishment responsible for London's governance and chaired the authority overseeing the capital's fire and rescue service. He should understand better than most the consequences of imposing substantial financial reductions upon organisations whose effectiveness depends upon experienced personnel, operational resilience and properly funded support services. Indeed, those of us involved in London's emergency services during that period remember only too well the arguments surrounding cuts, staffing reductions and the consequences for frontline operations. It is therefore remarkable to hear James Cleverly delivering lectures about the condition of policing in London without first acknowledging the record of the Conservative administrations with which he was associated. He is perfectly entitled to scrutinise the present Mayor and demand accountability for the Metropolitan Police. That is an essential part of democratic politics. But accountability cannot be selective, nor can political history be conveniently rewritten whenever responsibility becomes uncomfortable. If James Cleverly wishes to discuss the pressures facing the Metropolitan Police, perhaps he should begin by explaining how removing almost a third of its civilian workforce was supposed to strengthen the organisation, improve operational effectiveness or keep more warranted officers on London's streets. He might also explain why the responsibilities of the Home Secretary, particularly concerning police funding, national policing policy and the appointment and accountability of the Commissioner, should be overlooked when examining the consequences of Conservative decisions during those years. Those are legitimate questions, and they deserve serious answers. Before James Cleverly lectures anyone about the state of policing in London, he ought to acknowledge what happened when his own party controlled both City Hall and the Home Office, and recognise that responsibility for the Metropolitan Police has always extended beyond the Mayor alone. Those of us who witnessed that period have not forgotten it, and neither should he.