RT @ciss_ajk: ๐ Keynote Address | INC-2026
โฉAt the Islamabad Non-Proliferation Conference (INC-2026), Lt. Gen. Khalid Ahmed Kidwai, NI, HIโฆ
๐ Infographic| CISSAJK
Keynote Address | INC-2026
โฉAt the Islamabad Non-Proliferation Conference (INC-2026), Lt. Gen. Khalid Ahmed Kidwai, NI, HI, HI (M) (Retd.), Advisor Development, National Command Authority, Pakistan, offered a strategic assessment of Pakistanโs deterrence posture and the evolving dynamics of strategic stability in South Asia.
@RadioactiveFrnd
@AsmaKhawaja5
#INC2026 #StrategicStability #Pakistan #NuclearDeterrence #SouthAsia
Radioactive Friends retweeted
๐๐๐๐ ๐๐ฏ๐๐ง๐ญ | ๐๐๐ญ๐ก ๐๐ซ๐๐๐ค ๐.๐ ๐๐จ๐ซ๐ค๐ฌ๐ก๐จ๐ฉ ๐จ๐ง ๐๐ฎ๐๐ฅ๐๐๐ซ ๐๐๐ญ๐๐ซ๐ซ๐๐ง๐๐ & ๐๐ญ๐ซ๐๐ญ๐๐ ๐ข๐ ๐๐ญ๐๐๐ข๐ฅ๐ข๐ญ๐ฒ ๐ข๐ง ๐๐จ๐ฎ๐ญ๐ก ๐๐ฌ๐ข๐, ๐๐จ๐ง๐๐จ๐ง
The workshop featured the following from the CISS delegation:
๐น ๐๐ญ. ๐๐๐ง. (๐) ๐๐๐ณ๐ก๐๐ซ ๐๐๐ฆ๐ข๐ฅ ๐๐(๐) โ Adviser, National Command Authority & Former DG, Strategic Plans Division
๐น ๐๐๐ฃ. ๐๐๐ง. (๐) ๐๐ฒ๐๐ ๐๐ก๐๐ก๐๐ ๐๐ก๐๐ก๐ข๐ โ DG Arms Control & Disarmament Affairs, Strategic Plans Division
๐น ๐๐ฆ๐. ๐๐ฅ๐ข ๐๐๐ซ๐ฐ๐๐ซ ๐๐๐ช๐ฏ๐ข โ Executive Director, CISS
๐น ๐๐ฆ๐. ๐๐ฎ๐ง๐ข๐ซ ๐๐ค๐ซ๐๐ฆ โ Former Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the UN Geneva
๐น ๐๐ฆ๐. ๐๐๐ฆ๐ข๐ซ ๐๐ค๐ซ๐๐ฆ โ Adviser, National Command Authority
๐น ๐๐ซ. ๐๐๐๐๐ฆ ๐๐๐ฅ๐ข๐ค โ Executive Director, Strategic Vision Institute
๐น ๐๐ซ. ๐๐๐๐๐ซ ๐๐๐ฐ๐๐ณ ๐๐๐ฌ๐ฉ๐๐ฅ โ Acting Vice Chancellor, Quaid-e-Azam University
๐น ๐๐ฌ. ๐๐ฆ๐ง๐ ๐๐๐ช๐ข๐ โ Research Officer, CISS
๐น ๐๐๐๐ฎ๐ฅ ๐๐จ๐ข๐ณ ๐๐ก๐๐ง โ Research Officer, CISS
The keynote and panel discussions contributed to the workshop's wider discourse on nuclear deterrence, limited conflict and strategic stability, highlighting the importance of responsible state behaviour, strategic communication and sustained diplomatic engagement in reducing the risk of escalation in South Asia.
#CISS #IISS #NuclearDeterrence #StrategicStability #SouthAsia #Pakistan #ArmsControl
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๐ ๐ก๐ญ๐ญ๐ฉ๐ฌ://๐๐ข๐ฌ๐ฌ.๐จ๐ซ๐ .๐ฉ๐ค
๐ ๐๐๐ง๐ญ๐๐ซ ๐
๐จ๐ซ ๐๐ง๐ญ๐๐ซ๐ง๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง๐๐ฅ ๐๐ญ๐ซ๐๐ญ๐๐ ๐ข๐ ๐๐ญ๐ฎ๐๐ข๐๐ฌ
๐ ๐
๐จ๐ฅ๐ฅ๐จ๐ฐ ๐๐๐๐: ๐ | ๐ | ๐ข๐ง | ๐ธ | ๐ฑ
Radioactive Friends retweeted
๐๐๐๐ ๐๐ฏ๐๐ง๐ญ | ๐๐๐ฒ๐ง๐จ๐ญ๐ ๐๐๐๐ซ๐๐ฌ๐ฌ
๐๐ญ. ๐๐๐ง. (๐) ๐๐๐ณ๐ก๐๐ซ ๐๐๐ฆ๐ข๐ฅ ๐๐(๐)
๐๐๐ฏ๐ข๐ฌ๐๐ซ, ๐๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง๐๐ฅ ๐๐จ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐ง๐ ๐๐ฎ๐ญ๐ก๐จ๐ซ๐ข๐ญ๐ฒ, ๐๐๐ค๐ข๐ฌ๐ญ๐๐ง
๐๐๐๐ ๐๐๐๐๐ช๐ฎ๐๐ซ๐ญ๐๐ซ๐ฌ, ๐๐จ๐ง๐๐จ๐ง (@IISS_org )
Lt. Gen. (R) Mazhar Jamil HI(M), Adviser NCA & former DG SPD, highlighted Political Dialogue, Credible Deterrence, and Crisis Management as essential to Strategic Stability in South Asia.
He underscored that political beliefs and strategic thinking of states form the basis of policies that shape the strategic and security environment of the region. He stressed that sustainable strategic stability requires political leadership to prioritize dialogue and conflict resolution over military adventurism and coercive policies, particularly in a nuclearized environment.
Highlighting the unresolved Kashmir dispute, he emphasized that unresolved disputes require political solutions and sustained engagement, warning that military escalation between nuclear-armed states carries serious risks and cannot provide a durable basis for regional peace.
He raised concerns about nuclear and missile modernization, advanced space-based capabilities, and dual-capable delivery systems that increasingly blur the distinction between conventional and nuclear operations, combined with the absence of robust arms-control arrangements and institutionalized confidence-building measures.
Reflecting on the Pakistan-India crises of 2019 and May 2025, he stressed that responsible political leadership, strategic restraint and clear communication remain essential to crisis management, warning that assumptions about controlling escalation can prove dangerously misplaced under compressed decision timelines.
He highlighted Pakistan's concept of Quid Pro Quo Plus (QPQ+), a strong and calibrated conventional response within the framework of effective nuclear deterrence, emphasizing that deterrence rests not on rhetoric but on credible capabilities, strategic clarity and disciplined decision-making.
He also raised concerns over India's evolving sea-based nuclear capabilities, warning that deployment of nuclear-capable sea-based systems, in the absence of adequate transparency and notification arrangements, could introduce additional uncertainty into regional crisis dynamics.
Pakistan reaffirms its readiness to pursue dialogue on all outstanding issues and calls for objective international engagement in support of conflict resolution and regional stability.
#CISS #IISS #NuclearDeterrence #StrategicStability #SouthAsia #Pakistan #Deterrence #Kashmir
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๐ ๐ก๐ญ๐ญ๐ฉ๐ฌ://๐๐ข๐ฌ๐ฌ.๐จ๐ซ๐ .๐ฉ๐ค
๐ ๐๐๐ง๐ญ๐๐ซ ๐
๐จ๐ซ ๐๐ง๐ญ๐๐ซ๐ง๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง๐๐ฅ ๐๐ญ๐ซ๐๐ญ๐๐ ๐ข๐ ๐๐ญ๐ฎ๐๐ข๐๐ฌ
๐ ๐
๐จ๐ฅ๐ฅ๐จ๐ฐ ๐๐๐๐: ๐ | ๐ | ๐ข๐ง | ๐ธ | ๐ฑ
Radioactive Friends retweeted
๐๐๐๐ ๐๐ฏ๐๐ง๐ญ | ๐๐๐ญ๐ก ๐๐ซ๐๐๐ค ๐.๐ ๐๐จ๐ซ๐ค๐ฌ๐ก๐จ๐ฉ ๐จ๐ง ๐๐ฎ๐๐ฅ๐๐๐ซ ๐๐๐ญ๐๐ซ๐ซ๐๐ง๐๐ & ๐๐ญ๐ซ๐๐ญ๐๐ ๐ข๐ ๐๐ญ๐๐๐ข๐ฅ๐ข๐ญ๐ฒ ๐ข๐ง ๐๐จ๐ฎ๐ญ๐ก ๐๐ฌ๐ข๐
๐๐๐๐ ๐๐๐๐๐ช๐ฎ๐๐ซ๐ญ๐๐ซ๐ฌ, ๐๐จ๐ง๐๐จ๐ง | ๐๐๐ญ๐จ๐๐๐ซ ๐๐๐๐
The Centre for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad, co-hosted the 11th Track 1.5 Workshop on Nuclear Deterrence and Strategic Stability in South Asia with the International Institute for Strategic Studies (@IISS_org) at the IISS Headquarters, London, on October 13, 2026.
The CISS delegation was led by Lt. Gen. (R) Mazhar Jamil HI(M), Adviser, National Command Authority, Government of Pakistan. The delegation comprised Maj. Gen. Syed Shahab Shahid, DG Arms Control & Disarmament Affairs, SPD; Amb. Ali Sarwar Naqvi, Executive Director CISS; Amb. Munir Akram, Former Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the UN Geneva; Amb. Zamir Akram, Adviser NCA; Dr. Naeem Salik, Executive Director, Strategic Vision Institute; Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, Acting Vice Chancellor, Quaid-e-Azam University; Ms. Amna Saqib, Research Officer CISS; and Abdul Moiz Khan, Research Officer CISS.
#CISS #IISS #NuclearDeterrence #StrategicStability #SouthAsia #Pakistan
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๐ ๐ก๐ญ๐ญ๐ฉ๐ฌ://๐๐ข๐ฌ๐ฌ.๐จ๐ซ๐ .๐ฉ๐ค
๐ ๐๐๐ง๐ญ๐๐ซ ๐
๐จ๐ซ ๐๐ง๐ญ๐๐ซ๐ง๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง๐๐ฅ ๐๐ญ๐ซ๐๐ญ๐๐ ๐ข๐ ๐๐ญ๐ฎ๐๐ข๐๐ฌ
๐ ๐
๐จ๐ฅ๐ฅ๐จ๐ฐ ๐๐๐๐: ๐ | ๐ | ๐ข๐ง | ๐ธ | ๐ฑ
Radioactive Friends retweeted
'Indian military thinking being shaped by dangerous ideology,' NCA adviser Lt Gen (retd) Mazhar Jamil at IISS workshop
Read more: thepakistanconnect.com/lt-geโฆ
#pakistanconnect
Radioactive Friends retweeted
An IAEA team of experts has concluded today a 12-day International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission in Pakistan.ย The mission, conducted at the request of the Government of Pakistan, took place from 28 September to 9 October 2026. It was the first IPPAS mission to Pakistan.
atoms.iaea.org/3TOu8U4
Radioactive Friends retweeted
Pakistan at the UN First Committee (9 Oct): India launched an โunprovoked military assaultโ last year and now claims a right to strike โat a time of its choosing.โ
Pakistanโs delegate: โThe notion that a limited conventional war can be fought and contained under a nuclear overhang is a dangerous delusion.โ
This isn't restraint โ itโs a recipe for catastrophe between two nuclear-armed states. The world can't afford Indiaโs โnew normalโ of strikes under a nuclear shadow.
#PakistanAtUN #FirstCommittee #NuclearOverhang #SouthAsia #Disarmament #UNGA81 #StrategicStability #Pakistan
Radioactive Friends retweeted
The Restraint Paradox
President Putinโs @Valdai_Club line on Kaliningrad is being read as a threat. It is also a correction, and the correction is the more interesting part.
Since 2022, Russian nuclear โข๏ธ non-use has been converted, in parts of the Western debate, from a completed outcome into a precedent: red lines crossed, early-warning and long-range aviation assets struck, no nuclear reply, therefore the threshold is elastic and the next operation is easier to authorise. That is the restraint paradox. Non-use lowers the danger of the episode just finished. It can enlarge the menu of the episode that follows, precisely because a contingent result is mistaken for a standing permission.
The mechanism is the defenderโs whole response package โ conventional retaliation, attrition, diplomacy, residual capability โ read by the other side as a map for use/ non-use. The reading is conditioned by target function, systemic effect, perceived intent, attribution, what capability remains, and cumulative damage. None of those variables is fixed. A strike that looked bounded in 2024 does not carry the same meaning after further damage in 2026. Confidence rises while the conditions of the next decision are changing. That is how overconfidence forms.
The #Ukraine record does not reveal a stable Russian nuclear threshold, and it does not establish a safe zone for limited war against nuclear-associated forces. It shows bounded expansion, some correction, and persistent uncertainty. Restraint is evidence about an episode that has already closed. It is not a licence to repeat it, widen it, or relocate it.
Kaliningrad makes the distinction concrete. A direct attack, or a blockade treated as one, is not another drone strike on a bomber base. Putinโs formulation โ that the question of โall the weapons at our countryโs disposalโ would be immediately on the agenda โ does not disclose a trigger. It rejects the inference that silence so far is silence next time. France and Britain are nuclear powers; NATO is larger; neither fact converts non-use in Ukraine into a corridor around Russian territory.
The same error runs in both directions. Treating every warning as a bluff already called, and treating every warning as an automatic tripwire, are both ways of inventing a threshold the record does not contain. Arrogance, as Putin put it, is the path to the brink. The arrogance that matters analytically is the belief that a nuclear powerโs restraint has been priced, and can therefore be spent again.
reuters.com/world/europe/putโฆ @Reuters
@KBruusgaard @shashj @nktpnd
Radioactive Friends retweeted
My take on the very Iranian resilience in the face of external aggressions. Iran hasn't just survived them. It absorbed, adapted and outlived them...
@Sheeshgar1 @RadioactiveFrnd
@IranObserver pakistantoday.com.pk/2026/09โฆ
Radioactive Friends retweeted
The โspace as sanctuaryโ argument is now harder to sustain. For years, talk of orbital weapons was treated as alarmism. The creation of dedicated space forces was dismissed by many as bureaucratic theatre. That debate has been overtaken by events.
A senior US official has now said publicly that on-orbit space-control weapons already exist and can be used to defend forces against hostile action. Beijing urged an end to โpreparing for war in outer space.โ Moscow said space โmust be free of any weapon.โ Those statements matter. So does the record that preceded them.
Russiaโs No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space initiative was carefully worded for a reason: it treated placement itself as the threshold. The Conference on Disarmament has been deadlocked for years on PAROS. That deadlock now has a sharper political problem. If the public line is that weapons are already on orbit, the old formula โ โprevent an arms race before it startsโ โ loses force. What follows is not automatically war. It is a more open contest over thresholds, signalling, and first-use incentives.
That is the dangerous part. Space was militarised long before this weekโs wording. Navigation, reconnaissance, electronic attack, inspector satellites, and ground-based anti-satellite systems have been part of the domain for years. Several states built counter-space tools while still speaking the language of peaceful use. The novelty is not the existence of military space activity. The novelty is the public label.
Deterrence needs some clarity. Too much clarity, with no agreed limits, invites matching programmes and a race in rhetoric as well as hardware. Mix that with AI-enabled ISR and compressed decision cycles, and crisis stability gets worse. Decision-makers used to buy time. An AI-assisted kill-chain in orbit may not. The risk is a โfail-deadlyโ logic: strike when the other side looks as if it is about to move, not after it has moved. Pre-emption starts to look like prudence. That is how first-strike thinking becomes normal without anyone declaring it as doctrine.
Official responses so far have been measured. No matching on-orbit systems have been publicly admitted by others. That restraint is useful, if it holds. It should not be mistaken for an absence of capability. The practical question is no longer whether space is a churchyard. It is not. The question is whether the major spacefaring states can still define red lines, debris limits, and crisis communications before the next serious incident writes the rules for them.
The sermon is over. Strategy has to begin.
Read ๐ : Financial Times, โUS military reveals it has weapons in spaceโ โ ft.com/content/09d62f21-8697โฆ
@RadioactiveFrnd @US_SpaceCom @CNSA_en @roscosmos @KomissarWhipla @CSIS @ArmsControlWonk @UNOOSA @CISS_Islamabad @ciss_ajk @CISSS_Karachi @bttn_quetta @SVI_Pakistan @BrunoTertrais
Radioactive Friends retweeted
Replying to @SubhanJaved911
History doesnโt repeat, but it rhymes.
1965 Dwarka: Indian carrier and heavy units sit in harbour while PN fights.
2025: Pakistani maritime posture again shaped the carrier problem: the CSG was not free to loiter and strike with impunity off our coast; it closed, then withdrew under the threat of being hit.
Same asymmetry of will at sea. Different weapons.
Happy Pakistan Navy Day
@OfficialDGISPR @dgprPaknavy @DGPR_PAF @RadioactiveFrnd @sufianullah
Radioactive Friends retweeted
The propaganda recycled by @thehansindia appears to have been scripted by a rookieโhence the anonymity and complete absence of citations.
Pakistanโs power reactors are all under IAEA safeguards. They generated 17.7% of national electricity in FY2025 and 18.5% during JulโMar FY2026. Pakistanโs Nuclear Energy Vision 2050 envisages expanding nuclear capacity to 40,000 MWe.
Before scrutinising Pakistan, @thehansindia might hold up a mirror to Bharat.
Bharatโs separation plan placed only 14 of its then-22 thermal reactors under safeguards. The PFBR, FBTR and key fuel-cycle facilities were excluded, while Delhi retained the โsole rightโ to decide which future reactors would be designated civilianโa Mickey Mouse-type firewall.
The 2008 NSG waiver allowed imported uranium to fuel safeguarded reactors while indigenous uranium and separated plutonium from unsafeguarded PHWRs remained available to Bharatโs strategic complex. That is resource fungibility underwriting military options.
On 6 April 2026, Bharatโs unsafeguarded 500-MWe PFBR attained criticality. Its own Department of Atomic Energy confirms that the reactorโs U-238 blanket breeds Pu-239. A peer-reviewed neutronics study estimates that it could produce up to 140 kg of weapons-grade plutonium annuallyโsufficient for approximately 28 weapons at 5 kg each.
Bharatโs 1974 nuclear test used plutonium produced in the Canadian-supplied CIRUS reactor, which had been pledged to peaceful use. That diversion triggered the creation of the NSG. Yet the state that demonstrated how peaceful nuclear cooperation could be diverted was rewarded with an exceptional NSG waiver in 2008.
Before lecturing Pakistan, explain that circle.
To save the Bhakts the trouble of doing their own research:
1. finance.gov.pk/survey/chapteโฆ
2. iaea.org/sites/default/filesโฆ
3. dae.gov.in/prototype-fast-brโฆ
4. tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.โฆ
5. nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/inโฆ
@ciss_ajk @ArmsConAdvisor @ZarrarKhuhro @LodhiMaleeha @Mushahid @ForeignOfficePk @TahirAndrabi @murtazasolangi @RadioactiveFrnd @zafarwafa1977 @zafar_jaspal #Pakistan #Nuclear #Defence #IAEA @iaeaorg @DerekJGrossman @rafaelmgrossi #Bharat #India #Hindutva #Hindustan #Modi @AJEnglish
Radioactive Friends retweeted
Replying to @business
Ambassador Sergio Gor appears to be suffering from a classic case of what seasoned diplomats call โlocalitisโ โ the occupational hazard of going native, adopting the host countryโs narrative and colour so thoroughly that it becomes divorced from the interests and long-standing positions of oneโs own country.
Calling Indian-illegally occupied Jammu & Kashmir an โimportant part of Indiaโ during his first visit to Srinagar may play well in New Delhi, but it sits uneasily with decades of U.S. policy that has treated the territory as disputed and subject to relevant UN Security Council resolutions.
Itโs an affront to Kashmiris, who have suffered atrocities and oppression for decades. How can a so-called โdiplomatโ, who subscribes to the core tenets and foundations - life, liberty and pursuit of happiness- of USA be so insensitive!
Pakistan has categorically rejected his characterisation as factually incorrect and irresponsible.
@ForeignOfficePk underscored that J&K remains an internationally recognised disputed territory awaiting final disposition in accordance with UNSC resolutions and the aspirations of the Kashmiri people, and that such remarks negate Washingtonโs own documented position while running contrary to the supremacy of international law and the UN Charter.
Diplomats are meant to represent their capital, not absorb the worldview of the capital they are posted to. Thatโs a new low in diplomacyโฆ
@USAmbIndia @SergioGor @ForeignOfficePk @usembislamabad @USAndIndia
@ciss_ajk @AsmaKhawaja5 @TahirAndrabi
Radioactive Friends retweeted
Hindustan ๐ฎ๐ณ has produced a documentary called Declassified that declassifies no evidence capable of settling the disputed claims: no target files, radar tracks, mission logs or aircraft-loss ledger: only official voices, selective footage and cinematic reconstruction.
To Bharati ๐ฎ๐ณ readers: set aside every Pakistani ๐ต๐ฐ claim. Your own record is enough.
Pahalgam: GoI says the alleged gunmen were killed on 28 July - 82 days after the 7 May strikes. The film cannot convert the assertion that their โmastersโ were hit into proof that those targets were responsible for Pahalgam.
Losses: CDS Gen Anil Chauhan admitted that Indian aircraft were downed. @Reuters cited US ๐บ๐ธ officials saying at least two fell, including a #Rafale; Franceโs Air Chief said evidence indicated three. A โ100% successfulโ account that omits its acknowledged opening losses is anything but declassified history.
Delhi: The sensational โmissile aimed at Delhiโ story surfaced over a year later through a commentator. Indiaโs contemporaneous MoD account identified airbases, ammunition depots, airports and cantonments rather than Delhi. No trajectory, sensor log or interception data is shown.
โNo answerโ: Hindustanโs ๐ฎ๐ณ own briefings recorded Pakistani missile and drone attacks across numerous military sites. Bharat ๐ฎ๐ณ neither compelled Pakistan ๐ต๐ฐ to absorb the first strike nor prevented retaliation. Pakistan accepted no Indian โnew normalโ.
Victory: Indiaโs 10 May statement says both sides agreed to stop military action. The documentary itself brings Rubio into the story; Washington publicly called it a US-brokered ceasefire. An agreed cessation, reached after urgent US @realDonaldTrump intervention, canโt be repackaged as Bharati ๐ฎ๐ณ victory, much less Pakistani ๐ต๐ฐ capitulation.
Even if every claimed Hindustani ๐ฎ๐ณ weapon struck its assigned coordinate, success is measured by whether the adversaryโs behaviour changed. Even @realDonaldTrump continues to remind Hindustan ๐ฎ๐ณ of the aircraft losses and the US ๐บ๐ธ role in ending the conflict!
Pakistan ๐ต๐ฐ retaliated, imposed costs and conceded nothing.
Bharat ๐ฎ๐ณ attempted compellence. Pakistan ๐ต๐ฐ restored deterrence. That is the whole board.
Cinema can edit footage. It cannot edit strategic outcomes.
#MarkaEHaq #OperationSindoor
@DiscoveryIN @nitingokhale @SpokespersonMoD @IAF_MCC @gauravcsawant @AdityaRajKaul
More than a year after Marka-e-Haq, India refuses to face the harsh reality. Instead of conceding defeat in a failed venture, India has decided to colour history in her preferred hues. To achieve this mutilation of history, Indian content creators have produced a highly dramatised, coloured and factually inaccurate account of so-called Operation Sindoor, packaged as a documentary featuring senior political and military leadership of India. For its lack of nuance and seriousness, the documentary can be characterised as a tragedy and a comedy at the same time. Selectively edited interviews, emotional narration and cinematic Bollywood style reconstruction have been used to alter established facts and rewrite the operational outcome.
Tellingly, the documentaryโs account contains fundamental contradictions, exposing a belated attempt to manufacture a domestically palatable version of events.
The documentary attempts to establish a deliberate linkage between an address by the Pakistanโs Chief of Army Staff on 16 April 2025 and the Pahalgam incident of 22 April 2025, conjuring a conspiracy theory out of nothing. More significantly, India subsequently claimed that the three alleged perpetrators of Pahalgam were identified and eliminated on 28 July 2025, 82 days after so called Operation Sindoor. Yet the documentary presents so called Operation Sindoor as the punishment for those responsible for Pahalgam. If the alleged perpetrators were eliminated on 28 July, India must explain, who it claims to have punished on 7 May 2025.
The claim of โ100 percent mission successโ is equally detached from operational record. During Marka-e-Haq, Pakistanโs Armed Forces successfully thwarted Indian aggression and shot down 8 military aircraft. Pakistan subsequently conducted Operation Bunyanum Marsoos, employing Fatah precision-guided rockets & missiles, PAF precision munitions, long-range loitering munitions and precision artillery against 26 military targets, including facilities used to target Pakistani citizens, and entities involved in fomenting terrorism against Pakistan.
The documentary itself further undermines its claim of clear Indian dominance. Indian military leadership acknowledges extensive Pakistani missile, drone and air activity, sustained engagements along the Line of Control and the activation of Indian air-defence systems. Such admissions are difficult to reconcile with its repeated portrayal of Pakistan being decisively defeated.
The documentaryโs account of the cessation of hostilities is no less revealing. Its own narration confirms that hostilities ended through communication between the two DGMOs and an agreed cessation of military action. This alone contradicts the attempt to portray Op Sindoor as a unilateral Indian military triumph. A cessation of hostilities, facilitated by US, cannot subsequently be repurposed as evidence of unconditional victory.
The documentary also contradicts itself on escalation dynamics. It repeatedly emphasises surprise, precision, deep strikes and escalation dominance, while simultaneously claiming that India deliberately limited the conflict and provided Pakistan an โexit windowโ. These competing claims expose the production as a carefully constructed domestic narrative rather than an objective military account.
India has not declassified the truth. It has cobbled together a propaganda video to project a military blunder as a successful endeavour.
No amount of cinematic reconstruction can change the chronology, erase aircraft losses, conceal military casualties, alter the military engagements that actually took place or convert a battlefield defeat into a self-proclaimed victory.
Pakistan has no need to manufacture a narrative around Marka-e-Haq. The operational record, battlefield evidence, diplomatic exchanges and Indiaโs own subsequent statements speak for themselves and are widely acknowledged by international community.
Pakistan remains committed to regional peace and stability. At the same time, the Armed Forces of Pakistan remain fully prepared and capable of defending the countryโs sovereignty, territorial integrity and national interests. Any future military misadventure will be met with a firm, decisive and disproportionate response, after which no amount of cinematic perjury will be able to provide any face-saving to India.
Radioactive Friends retweeted
Replying to @narendramodi
14 August is not yours to appropriate, Mr Modi. It is Pakistanโs Independence Dayโnot an occasion to reduce another nationโs freedom to Bharatโs grievance. We mourn every innocent uprooted or killed in 1947; we reject the cynical weaponisation of their suffering to delegitimise Pakistan.
Iqbal gave political form to Muslim nationhood; Jinnah declared Muslims โa nation by any definitionโ; and the 1945โ46 elections delivered the mandateโthe Muslim League won all 30 Muslim seats in the Central Assembly and 87% of Muslim provincial seats. Even your ideological forebear Savarkar conceded in 1937 that India contained โtwo nations in the main,โ while Ambedkar warned that Hindu Raj would be โthe greatest calamityโ for India. Hindutvaโs treatment of Indian Muslims now demonstrates why those warnings mattered.
Before preaching harmony, honour the UN commitment to a free and impartial plebiscite in IIOJK. Kashmiris remain a people denied self-determination; Khalistan persists as an unresolved political aspiration; and Naga, Manipuri and other nationalities still press claims Delhi has not extinguished. India has faced at least 11 secessionist movements since 1947; the Red Corridor once reached 126 districts.
An iron fist may suppress identities temporarily; it cannot erase them. Pakistanโs birth is not Bharatโs danger. The danger is a fascist Hindutva project widening Bharatโs own fractures while pretending history ended in 1947.
#PakistanIndependenceDay
@OfficialDGISPR @ForeignOfficePk @TahirAndrabi
Radioactive Friends retweeted
Amnesty Intโl: India ๐ฎ๐ณ shipped weapons, ammo & components to Israel in at least 2,596 consignments since Oct 2023 โ machine-gun parts, 155 mm artillery shells, SkyStriker warheads & more.
Sec-Gen Agnรจs Callamard: India risks complicity in Gazaโs ongoing genocide. ICJ has already flagged a plausible risk. Indian companies kept profiting while the destruction continued.
Amnesty calls on India ๐ฎ๐ณ to halt all such exports immediately & join the Arms Trade Treaty.
Full investigation: amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2โฆ
#Gaza #India #ArmsTrade #Amnesty
@hushamahmed @usmanjadoon_fsp @PakistanPR_UN @amnesty @AgnesCallamard @AIIndia @amnestyusa @azadessa @FranceskAlbs
Radioactive Friends retweeted
Replying to @RadioactiveFrnd
Radioactive Friends retweeted
Dr. @zahirhkazmiโs analysis rightly exposes the biased, Eurocentric narratives of certain media houses.
These documentaries frequently exhibit deep-seated cognitive biases, projecting external anxieties while ignoring their own strategic vulnerabilities.
The fact is that Pakistanโs strategic assets are governed by a multi-layered, state-of-the-art Command and Control mechanism. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has repeatedly verified the effectiveness of our regulatory frameworks, with Pakistan scoring high marks on the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) Index as one of the most improved states for nuclear security compliance.
Driven by the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA), our program operates entirely under recognized global safety benchmarks.
As a sovereign nation, Pakistan is answerable only to valid international legal institutions, not to sensationalist media outlets.
Meanwhile, western media remains conspicuously silent on India's escalating security risks. For over a decade, a radicalized political leadership has held the nuclear trigger in New Delhi, presiding over a highly questionable "No First Use" policy, multiple high-profile uranium theft scandals, and the accidental misfire of a nuclear-capable BrahMos missile into Pakistan, and cyber security breaches in their critical infrastructures.
This blatant double standard, and blurred vision, exposes the clear political bias of these external narratives.
@ciss_ajk @zafarwafa1977 @RadioactiveFrnd
Here is what DWโs 52-minute hatchet job and @realZalmayMK years old anti Pakistan ๐ต๐ฐ itch
will not tell you:
๐ต๐ฐ did not nuclearise South Asia, ๐ฎ๐ณ Bharat did in 1974, misusing foreign-supplied nuclear assistance. Pakistanโs deterrent was an unavoidable response, not an adventure.
Pakistanโs nuclear โข๏ธ assets have remained secure under a robust command-and-control system, while recurring theft and trafficking of radioactive material in India are quietly ignored.
Pakistan did not create the Kashmir dispute; it remains unresolved under international law. Nor did Pakistan initiate the 2025 conflict. India used a false flag operation to launch an aggression Pakistan and get a bloody nose again. Pakistan responded with restraint and resolve, restored deterrence and accepted Indian request through mediators for the ceasefire.
And Pakistan is not a sponsor of terrorism. It is among terrorismโs greatest victims: more than 80,000 lives sacrificed and enormous economic losses sustained while dismantling Indian sponsored terrorist networks with its own blood.
Pakistan was won through extraordinary sacrifice and has been defended through extraordinary sacrifice. We neither need DWโs certificate nor fear its propaganda.
Criticise Pakistan by all means but bring facts, context and equal standards. Otherwise, call it what it is: a crude propaganda film masquerading as journalism.
Shame on them.
youtu.be/uxc3PH1wDFY?si=l744โฆ via @YouTube @dwnews



















