Johan (@Syndikalist) header
Johan (@Syndikalist) profile picture

Mostly RT interesting stuff. RT != Endorsement and all that jazz.

Crimea, Ukraine.
Joined May 2009
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You wouldn't believe the number of networks I've seen saved by canary credentials, this stuff works and it works extremely well. The first thing most threat actors do when they successfully break into a network is look for useful credentials to pivot off of or escalate access with. Make sure they find some. fake API keys, usernames and passwords, session tokens, NTLM hashes, password.txt. Put them everywhere. Servers, employee endpoints, password managers, the web browser's password/session databases, cloud storage buckets, network shares. The credentials should look legitimate, high value, and be unique to each individual system or user. That way you can set up granular detection for what happens when an attacker attempts to log in with a canary credential. You can not only instantly lock out the system it was stolen from, but also any real credentials belonging to that system/users, which may have been exfiltrated in the process.
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We are tracking a breach of a 3rd-party JS host impacting hundreds of high value websites. This is staggering.
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If you work with Active Directory, this one's worth your time. 👇 Ben just released Pathwarden, open source, single binary. Every scan feeds a history so you can track attack paths to Tier Zero over time: new, fixed, regressed. No more one-off snapshots. Plus prioritized fixes and auto-closing tickets. github.com/marbas207/Pathwar…
#Bloodhound shows you attack paths... but tracking over time, and knowing which few fixes to deploy can cost you a pretty penny in the Enterprise version. Pathwarden does it free. One program, no servers. Powered w/Rusthound by @g0h4n_0 🙏. Check it out: github.com/marbas207/Pathwar…
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NUREMBERG - Official Trailer
🤖 Made with AI
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I get what Google is trying to do, but I don't agree with it at all. Sure, there are some vendors who just sit on bugs forever and don't make any effort to patch them. But there's way more overworked & underpaid teams, non-profits, and solo projects who are patching bugs as fast as they physically can. The number of CVEs found in 2026 is double that of 2025, so double the workload for anyone doing security fixes. Then on top of that, reducing the disclosure time from 90 to 60 days gives them 2/3 of the time to do double the work. At some point the dam is going to break. You have vulnerability researchers and AI companies burying software maintainers under an endless torrent of bug reports, while doing little to nothing to help with actually fixing the bugs. Eventually, the software maintainers are just going to burn out and give up.
In the age of AI, 90 days isn’t fast enough. Today, Project Zero updated our disclosure policy to reflect the changes needed to protect users in this new world. projectzero.google/2026/11/d…
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Just to put things right: 1/ Many read my #ARTEX signature release as "an IOC list". It isn't. The #IOCs expire within a year by design. The real release is the workflow: how to turn the next ARTEX-style attack into detections as fast as the attacker moves. 2/ ARTEX is an #LLM harness. Swap the model, prompts or infra and every IOC changes. What changes much less is how an agent behaves: machine-speed recon chains, ~1/s #PasswordSprays with rotating UAs, self-correcting API retries, systematic record enumeration. 3/ So the pack is behavior-first. Those patterns live in Sigma correlations, Sentinel KQL and Zeek SumStats on the upper network layers, not in packet filters. IPs are clearly labelled T3/T4 context for retro-hunting what already happened. 4/ The #playbook is the core: verify the source, classify how specific an indicator really is, assign a tier, route it to the right format, expire it. We applied it to four campaigns with an LLM assisting and humans gating every verification step. Next trail, same loop. 5/ That's the big picture: attackers use LLMs to compress weeks into hours. Defenders can use LLMs to compress "new report → tested detection" into hours too, as long as humans keep the verification gates. We must defend atacker's powered LLM/#AI with AI. 6/ The Zeek section shows how to carry the same behavioral logic into network sensors you already run. Playbook, rules and tests: [link]. Break them, send FP/TP reports. That's how this grows.
#BLOG: #MMD-072-2026 - #ARTEX detection signature pack - from #IOC w/#playbook : blog.malwaremustdie.org/2026… Artex detection signature pack's repo: github.com/unixfreaxjp/malwa… Read the playbook carefully, asses & test before apply, you can use my python scripts in /tools dir and see /tests result in github repo beforehand. Posted to inspire #block-ing this threat for defenders in FIRST(dot)oeg or xCERTs and xSIRTs. Hope helps. - @unixfreaxjp Nov,2026
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I love spicy vulnerability research blogs. They pretty much verbatim said that the fridge controller code was so bad that they decided it would be too much effort to set up a harness, instead audited the code by hand, at which point they found 6 critical pre-auth RCEs in under an hour. midnightblue.nl/blog/multipl…
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Proud to announce that @AWNetworks Labs has been working closely with the @FBICyberBranch to investigate and disrupt North Korea’s #BlueNoroff operations. Our team helped uncover a global campaign targeting 677 individuals across 58 countries. FBI FLASH: ic3.gov/CSA/2026/261112.pdf Our full report: arcticwolf.com/resources/blo… #BlueNoroff #ThreatIntel #DPRK
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A suspected MustangPanda APT backdoor disguised as PDF software. Sample shared for further malware analysis. dll:virustotal.com/gui/file/4748… anyrun分析:app.any.run/tasks/b4c1b80f-b… #MustangPanda #APT #Backdoor #MalwareAnalysis
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Johan retweeted
1/5 🇨🇳 Mustang Panda goes Green: Archive on workdrive.zohoexternal[.]jp: MM_Gov_Secure_Portal_Ref_992_2026.rar md5: 8424e607d7da598ac295905a0a7b1f47 Greenshot.exe md5: e47f8a304364122de4978ba4fcc9952d Abused for DLL side-load
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Johan retweeted
We have now published the PoC after the PoC. Enjoy :) I would say it is one of the most powerful primitives for logic LPE bugs. github.com/crisprss/CVE-2026…
🔐 Let’s talk Windows security! Bocheng Xiang (@crispr_x) & Hao Huang (@h4urek) - “TrustFall: When Windows Trusted Installer Betrays Its Trust” #POC2026
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Johan retweeted
Since the folks at ThreatBook developed both Artex and CyberStrikeAI, we figured we should contribute a bit to defending against and tracking AI agent attacks by sharing two feeds of instances running these agents on the public internet. Grab them if needed. Feeds: threatbook.io/hubfs/Feeds/AR… threatbook.io/hubfs/Feeds/CS…
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Johan retweeted
Dumping Kerberos TGTs with Microsoft’s own signed binary 🔥 I added –klist & –klist-dump to NetExec’s SMB & WinRM protocols 🚀 No LSASS dump, no scheduled task as the interactive user. Just the built-in klist.exe. Research: jakeotte.com/posts/klist-rev…
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When the #MDE has gaps, what can Defender’s local mpenginedb.db tell us? Curious if anyone in #DFIR has correlated this artifact with Advanced Hunting data in a real investigation. 🔥2 months of retention 🔥😉 better than nothing...
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hey PSA, @HuntressLabs has been chasing a pretty gnarly new incident of a ScreenConnect worm, hitting hundreds of hosts downstream during the holiday today -- genuinely please do read up on this one if you've got ye' ol RMM running ↙️ huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm…
Attackers are using cloud-hosted ScreenConnect panels to install rogue clients on managed endpoints. Don’t triage infected hosts with ScreenConnect. Connecting can spread the malware to your workstation and other panels you can access. Details and IOCs: okt.to/XnlhWg
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CVE-2026-85844 is patched: a Windows Kerberos authentication bypass (CVSS 9.8). Thanks @msftsecresponse for the fix! Write-up in 2027, unless someone beats me to it and I can stay lazy. msrc.microsoft.com/update-gu…
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We’re aware of CVE-2026-119618, a race condition in Apache mod_http2 that can lead to heap corruption and potentially RCE. We’re actively investigating. It appears to be configuration-specific, with only hosts with h2 enabled in Protocols being exposed. Patch now or drop h2 until you can.
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New on ThreatCat.ch! 🐈 We unpack a multi-stage malware loader, tracing its execution from a malicious Windows shortcut through several .NET stages to a Cobalt Strike Beacon. Read our technical analysis: threatcat.ch/blog/unpacking-… #MalwareAnalysis #ThreatResearch
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Replying to @SandflySecurity
@SandflySecurity 6.0 is really awesome all around, but the machine learning malware classifier is my baby and dramatically increases detection capability on Linux. It was built to hunt for network implants and related malware which are major threats to critical infrastructure providers. Let me discuss just some things it does in this thread.
Log in to answers, not alerts. Sandfly 6.0 is live! Your team opens the dashboard to a ranked list of real threats, with the triage already done. Agentless, and it works with or without AI. Read our blog on the new release: ap1.hubs.ly/H01wk6B0
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CerealLoader is the first malware I've seen to use custom mixed-mode assemblies that actually split logic between managed and unmanaged code using C++/CLI. By "hiding" execution of some of the malware code behind native stubs (.nep section), this technique makes analysis more challenging. I've written a POC to replicate how it functions: gist.github.com/TheEnergySto…
#ESETresearch has uncovered Cereal, a previously undocumented modular .NET toolset used by the Russia-aligned #Turla #APTgroup to turn victims’ Microsoft Exchange servers into stealthy long-term collection points. welivesecurity.com/en/eset-r… 1/6
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