
Economics faculty @isbedu. Dabble in a bit of microeconomic theory. वसुधैव कुटुम्बकम्। Ambedkarite. History, Indology. सोऽहं
Joined June 2021
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This is the most unfortunate take, but one that doesn’t surprise me at all, I have read in a long time.
Sure, the peer review process may have its biases and flaws. But what’s the alternative? A mutual admiration club with zero standards? Of course not the authors would say. But this is what these proposals eventually become.
What is stopping the Indian journals from being world class? Only one thing: quality. This is exactly like noises for increased protectionism by manufacturers who have failed to create globally competitive products. Both can only produce disasters.
Replying to @sanjeevsanyal
@sanjeevsanyal, Satvik Dev and @payalsharma62 examine India’s dependence on foreign journals and external quality assessments in shaping academic hiring, promotions and research funding, highlighting the wider challenge of building credible indigenous trust systems.
Aditya Kuvalekar retweeted
For years, Indians have paid well above world prices for solar panels.
A 40% customs duty on imported panels, 25% on cells, and rules letting only Indian-made panels into government-backed projects kept cheap Chinese imports out.
This is sound industrial policy.
CAVEAT: The idea was that Indian makers would use the profits from the import protection to climb up the value chain. You know, learn to not import tech.
Their own annual reports show how that went.
What it earned the companies:
- Five of India's biggest listed solar makers
-~₹7,300 cr combined profit in FY26
- The largest of them: over ₹10 cr profit a day
- Another kept ₹19 of every ₹100 of sales as profit
- The market leader's own annual report credits import duties with helping Indian makers "consolidate their market position"
What they spent on learning (FY26 annual reports):
- All five together
-~₹125 cr on R&D
- under 2% of their profit, or about six days of it
- The biggest spender among them: about 50 paise per ₹100 of sales
- The market leader: 18 R&D staff in a workforce of 10,000+
- One printed no R&D figure at all, in a year it made ₹1,082 cr profit
- Another's parent company reports R&D: "Nil"
- For scale:
-First Solar (US) spends ~₹4.50 per ₹100;
-LONGi and JA Solar (China) ~₹6 - while making heavy losses
What that leaves India with:
- Wafers for only about 1 in every 100 panels it makes
- The market leader's latest technology import: a 10 GW ready-made cell line (2025)
- It is "sending our engineers to China for structured training"
- 16 October: China proposes curbs on exporting 12 solar technologies
- The industry's answer: shop for machines in Germany, Japan and Korea instead
Consumers paid the premium.
The companies banked the profits.
Research got less than 2% of them.
(There is also a identifiable way out - how Indian solar tech players are struggling for orders - etc - this is in the article attached in next link)
Most commentary on India’s technology gap starts from the presumption that the human-capital problem is solved: that we have people who can compete in R&D with the very best, and that the only bottleneck is funding. This is far from true.
Take computer science. The productivity of Indian-origin computer scientists at leading US universities, measured by publications at top venues, is easily over 10 times that of the median scientist at some of our very best institutions.
The root of the problem is that our best talent migrates. And because the best minds like to be surrounded by people like them, migration cascades.
CS is the flavour of the zeitgeist and will remain so for the foreseeable future, and it is strategically vital for an Atmanirbhar Bharat. So some folks (@DeoSahil, @amargov, with a bit of help from @Shreyas_Mysuru and I) are hoping to put together a team which can initiate the process of creating a frontier CS research institute in India, hosting some of the best academics in computer science, and later electrical engineering. The goal is to attract the very best, most productive academics of Indian origin back to India.
Sahil and co are mainly solving the coordination problem: no scientist may want to return by herself, but when she sees that several others are interested, she may take the plunge too.
The main bottleneck is, of course, funding. By our estimates, a world-class institute can be started with about Rs 500 crore. That is large, but for context, Indian companies spent about Rs 40,800 crore on CSR in 2024-25, a third of it on education. Rs 500 crore amounts to about 1% of a single year’s CSR. We hope that this effort is able to attract enough of it to get this started.
If you share this passion and want to contribute, please reach out to Sahil / Amar or me. We must build this now!
Aditya Kuvalekar retweeted
Phenomenal export numbers. Goods exports almost touched $50 billion in October, up 45% from $34 billion last year. Overall exports rose 30% to nearly $89 billion.
The best news: the trade deficit fell by $5 billion as exports grew faster than imports.
Make in India and Atmanirbhar Bharat are paying off in difficult times. Our industry and policymakers deserve substantial credit.
At least now, we should recognise that real depreciation of the rupee is our friend and stop taking unnecessary risks to engineer artificial appreciation.
Exports = Jobs.
Aditya Kuvalekar retweeted
Not Strassen's theorem
Ludvig Sinander
arxiv.org/abs/2611.15527 [𝚎𝚌𝚘𝚗.𝚃𝙷]

ALT Suppose there is an uncertain state of the world, drawn from a CDF G. It is well known that the random posterior mean induced (via Bayes's rule) by a signal must have a distribution F that is a mean-preserving contraction of G, and conversely that any mean-preserving contraction is induced by some signal. This is not Strassen's (1965) theorem! It is a distinct result, versions of which were stated (or at least alluded to) by Hardy, Littlewood and Polya (1929), Blackwell (1951) and Kolotilin (2014). I give a precise statement and a complete proof.
Aditya Kuvalekar retweeted
Excited to share this new paper, co-authored with Max Mihm & Lucas Siga. We study a lemon's problem in organizations and politics that arises when one side has better info about which policies are viable and what they entail. Comments welcome!
Link here: sites.psu.edu/nageebali/file…
Revisited Moreland’s classic to finish the remaining few pages I had left. The ending is rather depressing. The oppressive economic institutions—described in great detail—probably set us back permanently.
Aditya Kuvalekar retweeted
Today, Foreign Affairs publishes a long essay I wrote summarizing some of my work on the global fertility collapse:
foreignaffairs.com/united-st…
It was a fantastic experience (with great editorial support) because the essay pushed me beyond pure economics to discuss issues such as geopolitics and polarization. Unlike some commentators, I don’t think the first-round economic consequences of fertility decline matter most; the second-round political and social ones do.
Yes, social security systems worldwide are in danger, but reality will impose itself sooner or later. The same politicians who swear over their ancestors’ tombs that retirement benefits will remain untouched will cut them (even if they are French). It will not be pretty, and most likely the cuts will come only after a major crisis and after politicians have tried everything else and failed.
Similarly, businesses will adapt to shrinking markets and valuations. Those who claim that capitalism somehow needs constantly expanding markets will be proven wrong. After all, this is the same misguided understanding of markets that has been proven wrong again and again since September 14, 1867, and that nobody really believes unless they have had the misfortune of earning a Ph.D. in a humanities department at an Ivy League school.
The real consequences will come when collapsing populations poison political systems. Look at the recent elections in eastern Germany. That is the future for all of us.
Also, the relative standing of great powers will shift drastically. Given current demographic trends, the U.S. will have a larger population than China by around 2100. The exact date depends on assumptions about net immigration into the U.S., but even with zero net immigration, the U.S. will overtake China by 2128. And Russia’s demographic future is only slightly more optimistic than China’s.
Those who dismiss these changes forget how antiquity ended in Western Europe. The western part of the Roman Empire entered acute demographic decline around 200 CE. By 476 CE, the western empire no longer existed. Despite some revisionist views that have cast a more positive light on late antiquity (and rightly corrected what was sometimes an overly negative assessment of the period), the fact is that England or France in 600 CE had lost most of their classical heritage, and material life had lost at least an order of magnitude in sophistication. The eastern part of the empire, however, weathered its demographic collapse much better and lasted another millennium.
No, I don’t believe we will go extinct (the Amish and Haredi will be enough for the survival of humankind), but the world will be very different in 2200 regardless of how you feel about it. The rational is the real and the real is the rational.
Aditya Kuvalekar retweeted
A point I emphasize again and again is that the relation between income and fertility is changing quickly, both within and between countries.
To make this point between countries, I take the total fertility rate (TFR) of up to 158 countries from the UN World Population Prospects and their GDP per capita from the Maddison Project, measured at purchasing power parity and in constant 2011 prices (that is, the data already correct for differences in price levels across countries and for inflation). I am not a big fan of the UN World Population Prospects, but this way nobody can accuse me of being selective with my sources.
Then I plot TFR against GDP per capita for 1950 (the start of the sample), 1985 (the midpoint of the sample), and 2022 (the last year in Maddison’s dataset).
The left panel includes all countries except the six Gulf oil exporters (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman), whose wealth comes from oil rents, not from their level of economic development. In the right panel, I also remove sub-Saharan Africa, a region with very poor data on TFR and GDP per capita.
Start with 1950 and 1985. Plot the two curves, and you will have trouble telling them apart. Countries with $2,000 of GDP per capita had 6.1 children per woman in 1950 and 5.9 in 1985. Countries with $5,000 had 4.3 in 1950 and 4.6 in 1985. Countries with $10,000 had 2.8 in both years. Countries got richer and had fewer children, but they moved down the same curve. In 1985, as in 1950, fertility dropped fastest between $5,000 and $10,000, and the typical country reached replacement (about 2.1 children per woman) only at around $14,000. Mexico, with $10,000 of GDP per capita, had 4.1 children per woman. Argentina, with $11,000, had 3.1.
And the relationship between TFR and GDP per capita held despite many other changes. For example, child mortality collapsed at every income level, literacy and life expectancy rose, again at every income level, modern contraceptive methods spread widely, and international organizations and local governments sponsored aggressive family-planning programs across Asia and Latin America from the 1960s. Nothing seemed to matter.
After 1985, the slope of the curve became much smaller (in absolute value) as the left end of the curve started falling quite fast while the right end of the curve barely changed. Interestingly, most of the fall came between 1985 and 1995, well before cell phones and social media (everyone’s favorite explanation) reached anyone outside a small elite of wealthy and highly educated persons.
At $2,000 of GDP per capita, fertility went from 5.9 children per woman in 1985 to 4.0 in 2022, a drop of 1.9 children. But at $20,000 of GDP per capita, fertility was 1.7 children per woman in 1985 and the same 1.7 in 2022.
Similarly, countries with 2.1 children per woman (roughly the replacement rate) were at $14,000 in 1985 but at $11,700 in 2022
Take Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka’s GDP per capita is $11,200, roughly the income at which the 2022 curve crosses replacement. According to the UN World Population Prospects, Sri Lanka has 2.0 children per woman in 2022, while the United States, with five times Sri Lanka’s income, has 1.7. The United States last had Sri Lanka’s income in 1923, when American women had about three children. And according to the most recent data from their national statistical agencies, Sri Lanka is in 2025 at 1.37 children per woman and the United States at 1.57. Sri Lanka has undershot American fertility by a considerable margin (yes, 1.37 is much lower than 1.57) a century before reaching American income.
I also decomposed the change in average TFR across countries into two parts. The first is the change from countries getting richer while moving along a fixed curve. The second is the change from the curve itself shifting, holding each country’s income fixed.
From 1950 to 1985, almost all of the fall in TFR comes from countries getting richer. Remember: the curve barely moved.
From 1985 to 2022, about 40% comes from countries getting richer and about 60% from the curve shifting down. That is the big surprise.
Is sub-Saharan Africa driving this result? Yes and no. In the right panel, we can see that the 1950 and 1985 curves barely change when we drop sub-Saharan Africa. Interestingly, the 2022 curve becomes almost flat. Outside sub-Saharan Africa, 92 of the 108 countries with more than $2,500 of GDP per capita have a TFR below 2.5. Most of the income gradient left in 2022 is an African gradient.
Why did the relation between TFR and GDP per capita hold for 35 years (in fact, for at least the early 1800s) and then fall? I do not have a proof, but my conjecture is that low fertility is driven not by income itself but by “modernity.” As I have explained in many posts, by “modernity” I mean the combination of phenomena such as large bureaucratic organizations, mass education, credentials, formal labor markets, and mass media. Until the 1980s, these features of modern life arrived together with economic development and high income. After 1990, the “modernity package” began to reach countries well ahead of income: secondary schooling for girls, television, and integration into global supply chains. Income stopped being a good proxy for “modernity,” so the curve drawn against income fell.
We are only beginning to glimpse the future of “modernity” without economic development. Mexico or Sri Lanka now have the fertility of Japan or Germany, but without the incomes of rich countries, without their state capability, and without their capacity to attract immigration. Becoming rich is no longer a precondition for having few children. Instead, for most of the planet, getting old before getting rich is the new normal.
The Megaspeed saga should make it to market design or even MBA Micro courses. When you ban a market, in most case, the market will find a way to exist through other channels.
FDPR prevented direct sales of the compute hardware to China. Megaspeed did not move any chips (afaik), they just leased the compute capacity to Alibaba via CaaS. Enforcing borderless, remote compute access is nearly impossible without global surveillance.
Classic lesson: legal prohibitions invariably enable intermediaries who benefit from a regulatory arbitrage.
On a sidenote, quite befitting that it is finally the thousand-year old technique—and not any AI-designed futuristic technology—that should precipitate the downfall of the man at the center of the AI boom.
NEW: We are short Nvidia $NVDA. We believe Nvidia has a significant China problem. Please see our full report and disclosures now available on our website, link in bio.
Wonderful news! EU-India collaboration will permeate all disciplines, from sciences to defence, art, and culture. It could be the most consequential partnership of the 21st century.
Happy Dhanteras to all of India from Europe. A €93.5 billion Dhanteras gift from Europe to India: Indian researchers will now be able to access Europe’s Horizon programme and lead funded projects.
Today, India and the European Commission concluded negotiations on India’s association with Horizon Europe, the EU’s flagship science and technology programme.
Indian researchers and organisations will be able to receive funding directly from Horizon Europe and lead collaborative projects, not merely join them as junior partners.
Association is beginning in January 2027.
Europe says these were its fastest-ever Horizon Europe association negotiations. And this is not a small research grant or a friendly statement about future cooperation.
Horizon Europe is a €93.5 billion programme. Its Pillar II, the part Indian organisations will be able to lead projects under, funds multinational research into health, digital technology, industry, space, climate, energy and the bioeconomy.
Indian scientists will work alongside European institutions on the problems both regions need to solve.
Indian startups and businesses will gain access to deeper research partnerships across Europe.
Indian organisations will be able to compete for funding and coordinate projects on substantially the same terms as their EU counterparts in the covered parts of the programme.
That last point matters. India is not being invited to sit outside Europe’s innovation system and watch. It is being brought inside the room.
Europe has some of the world’s finest universities, laboratories and industrial companies. India has extraordinary scientific talent, a huge engineering base, fast-growing startups and the ability to test new technology at enormous scale.
Put those strengths together and the partnership becomes much bigger than trade.
Europe and India can develop new medicines together. Build cleaner energy systems. Advance artificial intelligence, semiconductors and high-performance computing. Work on space, digital infrastructure and next-generation communications.
This is the closest form of research cooperation the EU offers to countries outside the union. And it comes at exactly the right moment.
Mercedes-Benz and other European companies are expanding Indian engineering and manufacturing. European companies are sourcing more technology and components from India. India and Europe are also moving toward a much larger trade relationship.
But this is no longer a one-way street. Tata is acquiring Italy’s Iveco in an approximately €3.8 billion deal, and Adani Ports has agreed to acquire Europe’s Evos for an enterprise value of €2.56 billion. Indian companies are now buying European industrial champions and energy infrastructure.
Now the research layer is being connected too. That is how a real technology partnership is built: scientific collaboration at the start, engineering and manufacturing in the middle, and globally competitive products at the end.
Not Europe using India only as a source of talent. Not India buying European technology off the shelf. Both regions funding research, sharing expertise and developing technologies together.
So this Dhanteras, I am celebrating something more valuable than gold. I am celebrating good health, innovation and knowledge. After all, you can take the boy out of Pune, but you cannot take Pune out of the man.
The knowledge inside India’s laboratories. The ambition of its researchers. The companies that will emerge from their discoveries. And a Europe willing to build the future with India rather than merely sell to it.
European research strength. Indian scientific talent. Shared innovation. That is the real wealth being created today.
Happy Dhanteras, India. Europe is ready to build with you.
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Promises to be an absolute cracker. And perhaps the best time to be writing this given the global developments. Best wishes @harshmadhusudan!
During this auspicious weekend of Dhanteras, Diwali and Lakshmi Puja, and with the blessings of the gods, elders and loved ones..
I am very happy and proud to announce that my third book is now available for pre-order in India:
"LONG INDIA:
The World's Greatest Investment Opportunity"
Here is the pre-order link:
amazon.in/Long-India-Greates…
#LongIndia will be globally released around 23 November 2026. More soon..
Aditya Kuvalekar retweeted
Efficiency fails when both sides join after learning their types in bilateral trading. If the seller instead commits before learning his, efficiency is always attainable under private values. With interdependent values, we show exactly when it fails econometricsociety.org/publi…
The Indian origin of the so-called Arabic numerals is truly hidden only from the illiterates.
Even as late as the thirteenth century, the Indian origin was beyond doubt. When Fibonacci introduced the system to Latin Europe in Liber Abaci (1202), he began his first chapter: “The nine figures of the Indians are these: 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1. With these nine figures, and with this sign 0, which in Arabic is called zephirum, any number is written.”
He had learned the method as a boy in Bugia, in North Africa, where his father ran the customs house for Pisan merchants. He later studied the arithmetic taught in Egypt, Syria, Greece, Sicily and Provence, and judged all of it, “even algorism and the arcs of Pythagoras,” almost an error compared with the method of the Indians.
His wording is careful. The digits are Indian, and only the name for zero is Arabic.
The Arab mathematicians themselves said the same thing. Al-Khwarizmi’s ninth-century treatise on the system was about calculating “by the Indian reckoning” (ḥisāb al-Hind). Its Latin translation was titled Algoritmi de numero Indorum, al-Khwarizmi on Indian numbers. Al-Uqlidisi’s tenth-century book on the same subject was called Kitāb al-fuṣūl fī al-ḥisāb al-hindī, the Book of Chapters on Indian Arithmetic. Arabic still calls these digits al-arqām al-hindiyya, Indian numerals.
Earlier still, in 662, the Syrian bishop Severus Sebokht praised the Indians’ method of calculating “by means of nine signs,” a few decades after the Arab conquests began.
Europeans called the digits “Arabic” because they got them from Arabs. The Arabs, and Fibonacci, knew better.
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