The @WindwardAI Q3 Risk Report is out. Since then Iran has attacked another 15 ships across the Middle East Gulf widening its range beyond Hormuz to Qatar and Sohar. among the highlights: * 87% of ships attacked were tankers (Q2: 28%). * 47% belonged to Gulf energy companies’ national shipping fleets (Q2: 12%). * 93% of attacks occurred in the Strait of Hormuz (Q2: 52%). * Most attacks hit vessels transiting the southern corridor with AIS off. The dark fleet went through its largest structural change since 2023 in Q3: tankers reflagged to Russia in record numbers. Windward’s dark fleet (over 20,000 dwt) now contains 223 Russia-flagged tankers. Of those, 84 changed MMSI numbers between July and September, indicating a change of flag during the quarter. That is more than four times the reflaggings of Q2 and nearly equals the total tracked since the start of 2025. Russia is now the largest flag in the dark fleet, with 18% of vessels by number and 14% by deadweight. The number of falsely flagged ships listed by the International Maritime Organization reached 613 by the end of Q3, up 39% since the start of the year. Together they total 24.8 million gross tonnes. A falsely flagged ship does one of two things: it registers with a fraudulent registry that has no authority to flag ships, or it broadcasts the flag of a legitimate registry whose maritime administration says it never authorized the vessel. Both appear in the IMO list. Guyana is the most used false flag by tonnage, at 15% of the total. Comoros is the most used by ship count, with 81 vessels; Comoros is a legitimate registry whose flag these ships broadcast without authorization. Malawi and Nicaragua follow. sign up for the Risk Report here: windward.ai/top-8-maritime-r…

Katie defiantly sits in my suitcase as I pack early this morning, because this means only one thing: her human is heading off on a work trip. I'm off to Fujairah for the @gulf_intel Energy Markets Forum, which is going to be one of the highlights of the year for me. Sean and the team have devised a packed agenda discussing live issues that are shaping the global economy. If you're going to be there please come and say hello! I'm on two panels and moderating two sessions so deep in preparation and will deliver the latest and best analysis from @WindwardAI

On Thursday, I’ll be briefing live with my colleague @ Matt Mueller on both Gulf chokepoints: Hormuz, six months into the closure, and Bab el-Mandeb, where Houthi forces now hold strategic ports along the Yemeni coast and Perim Island. We'll cover anchorage tanker counts and dark STS activity off Fujairah and Sohar, the U.S. strikes on Iranian tankers, daily transits vs. official claims, and where Gulf crude is being diverted. 45 minutes, then your questions. Thursday, September 17 | 8:00 AM EDT | 1:00 PM BST | 8:00 PM SGT Register: windward.ai/a-new-tanker-war…

There’s a lot of politically inspired figures about how many ships and how much oil is getting through the Strait of Hormuz. This depends on the average period cited and the size and type of all ships counted – which typically isn’t included. Oil is going through on dark tankers via the southern corridor through Omani waters, permitted under SOLAS for safety and security reasons. AIS off. LRIT off. Even seafarers switching off mobile phones. Real-time numbers aren’t possible and it takes clever querying, multi-source intelligence and forensic sleuthing to get anywhere near accurate numbers. My take: * preliminary * figures for August (crude only, minus Iran), is that exports are between 2/3 to 3/4 of pre-war levels. How do I arrive at this number? @Vortexa has west-of-Hormuz exports at ~6.2m bpd. That figure is likely to be revised upwards as more shipments become visible. Same thing happened for July figures which were at ~5m bpd at the beginning of August but now sit at ~5.5mbpd. So let’s take August at 6.5m bpd (a conservative take). Then consider that Saudi Arabia was diverting ~3m bpd via the East-West pipeline to the Red Sea in July, but that also became less visible in August as the Houthis ‘blockade’ saw loadings at Yanbu also go dark. Plus there’s now a diversion to the diversion, as VLCCs from Yanbu shuttle to & from SUMED pipeline at the mouth of the Suez Canal.  August numbers exported from there according to Vortexa are at 2.6m bpd, but likely to be revised higher as visibility increases. (July numbers were 3.7m bpd), up from 800kbpd in February). Pre-war, Vortexa estimated West-of-Hormuz crude exports (minus Iran) at 14.5 in Feb. So, adding up 6.5m bpd getting through plus Saudi diversions (anywhere from 2.6-3.7m bpd minus 800kbpd) you get about 57-65% of pre-war volumes. Then add on any upward revisions and increased UAE exports via Fujairah pipeline, and it’s easy to see how the southern corridor has scaled and we could get to the 66%-75% figure. Volumes shipped via Omani waters, under the right of transit passage are nearly four times higher than May when the US began offering military support and coordination via this route. I’m seeing a steady stream of VLCCs sailing from waters off Fujairah and Sohar, Oman, where STS transfers are being done from tankers undertaking shuttle services to and from terminals inside the Middle East Gulf. (see @Windwardai image of VLCCs below). In addition to those with their AIS on, there are others that don’t switch their AIS back on until they are well clear in the Indian Ocean. There are crazy numbers out there for VLCCs willing to do spot charters in the Middle East Gulf – a record $650k/day on Friday. That’s 27 times Frontline’s breakeven daily rate. As always spare a thought for the seafarers on all these ships. We've just concluded one of the most intensive weeks of Iranian attacks since at least late June, with a Saudi-owned VLCC fired on by unknown projectiles overnight.

now known as Era, the infamous VLCC Bella 1/Marinera (IMO 9230880) is being tracked by @WindwardAI making its final voyage to the scrapyard, under OFAC license. now flying the flag of Comoros, which although isn't the best one in the world, at least is a legitimate end-of-life ship registry. Bella 1 of course was the runaway tanker that turned Russian and painted a new name on its hull as it fled US forces that tried to board it while enforcing a US 'blockade' in Venezuela

It might be Friday but it’s always Catday for my loyal feline friend who is trilling quietly as she naps in my in-tray on my desk. There’s something very comfortable about working with your pets close by.

Iran's oil exports are back to normal, and after yesterday's announcement of the IMO-led evacuation corridor, the Strait of Hormuz is looking as busy as I've seen it since March 1-2 (except for the very small false start on April 18). Importantly, @WindwardAI is noting pathways are beyond the northern inbound and outbound Iran-controlled routes that have been used since early March, and the US-assisted southern corridor through Omani waters. there's a central corridor just up from the Traffic Separation Scheme that evolved in past 24-36 hours. and this morning I note a vessel going via the TSS. all significant developments, as 11,000 stranded seafarers make their way out and work to make the strait safe and secure continues.

Ask Me Anything at 1300 BST! FYI after the MoU was signed last night and first-movers began transits (both AIS-visible and dark) Iran sent a ‘zombie’ ship through Hormuz. A vessel falsely broadcasting the stolen identity of Gas Spirit I (IMO 7411569) transited the strait outbound. The liquefied petroleum gas carrier was broken up in February, 2023, according to the Equasis database. The identity of ship has yet to be determined. The use of IMO numbers from dead vessels is a common deceptive shipping practice used by Iran’s dark fleet to obfuscate the identity of sanctioned ships. The ship is now within Oman territorial waters near the port of Liwa with irregular AIS signals. Iran still not playing by the rules

I'm doing my first AMA (that's 'Ask Me Anything' according to my millennial colleagues) on X tomorrow at 1300 London time about the Strait of Hormuz.

After a protracted period dark off Chabahar with other sequestered tankers under the US blockade on Iran ports, two Iran-flagged very large crude carriers are sailing from the region with AIS on, past the US blockade. Both had been dark since March 14 and March 27 respectively and switched on their AIS today. Both tankers appear to be leaving the blockade area amid media reports that the memorandum of understanding to be signed in Geneva on Friday will provide Iran with waivers on oil sales. These concessions are likely part of deals to restore freedom of navigation to the Strait of Hormuz. The US administration had provided a 30-day waiver on Iran oil sales earlier in the war to assuage domestic concerns about surging fuel prices. The two tankers Diona (IMO 9569695) and Hero 2 (IMO 9362073) are owned by the National Iranian Tanker Co and were both sanctioned by the US in 2018. Their apparent departure from the blockade suggests that other Iranian-trading tankers are also preparing to resume trading

The big questions to ask this morning about the Russia shadow fleet tanker interdiction in the English Channel are: what was the legal basis and has Cameroon finally acted on its rogue registry which is the second-largest provider of flag services to shadow fleet tankers after Russia? Two Cameroon-flagged Russia tankers diverted from their intended course via the English Channel this morning after the very high-profile interception and boarding by British armed forces of Smyrtos (IMO 9389100) overnight. There are dramatic images Royal Marines sliding down ropes from helicopters on to the ship. Cameroon-flagged Smyrtos (according to its AIS and Equasis database), was built in 2009, and had loaded at the Russian Baltic port of Ust Luga. Absent from the feverish media coverage is the legal basis. Smyrtos was sanctioned by the UK in October 2025 and the EU in July 2025 and *appears* to be legitimately flagged. If so, the tanker has the right of innocent passage under international law. However, earlier this month the Cameroon government announced it was cleaning up its ship registry, Dozens of tankers had reflagged to Cameroon over the past six months because they were using fraudulent ship registries and effectively stateless. This was the legal basis for interdiction efforts seen across the Baltic, Atlantic and Mediterranean over the past 18 months and this vulnerability meant tankers had to find a "legitimate" flag. This is the 12th Russia shadow fleet tanker intercepted and boarded by European or UK authorities so far in 2026 we have tracked at @WindwardAI The last tanker Tagor (IMO 9282481) was boarded by French authorities with UK support on May 31. That tanker was falsely flagged with the fraudulent ship registry of Madagascar. The targeting of the Cameroon-flagged vessel comes months after the UK government pledged in February to deal with UK sanctioned shadow fleet tankers regularly sailing through its waters. The military operation saw Smyrtos boarded via helicopter and then redirected to the coastal waters off southern England. The vessel "met the requirements" for boarding a government spokesman said on the BBC this morning without further explanation. He flagged further tankers would be targeted. So far that hasn’t deterred 3 sanctioned shadow fleet tankers tracked through the Channel today. But they are not flagged with Cameroon. Those that are have diverted. So lots of headlines, little information. If this ship has been deflagged from Cameroon (but the IMO’s database has yet to keep up), that’s confusing. If the UK has found another legal basis to board and detain beyond article 110 of UNLCOS (stateless), then that’s interesting. My money is that Cameroon’s government has worked out that its registry has been hijacked by some rogue officials and that there is no legal basis for the registration of the 130-plus shadow fleet tankers. They might not have communicated that to official databases, but obviously told the UK government. Watching with interest.